1 Institute for the Study of War & AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 17
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, and Frederick W. Kagan
October 17, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside
the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against residential areas and critical
infrastructure throughout Ukraine on October 17. Russian troops struck Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia City, and areas in
Vinnytsia, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv Oblasts and launched nine missile strikes and 39 air strikes on
October 17.[1] Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson Yuriy Ignat noted that Russian forces launched 43 drones
from southern Ukraine, 37 of which Ukrainian troops destroyed and the majority of which were Iranian
Shahed-136 drones.[2] Five Shahed-136 drones struck infrastructure in the Shevchenkivskyi district of Kyiv,
including the UkrEnergo (Ukrainian electricity transmission system operator) building.[3]
The October 17 drone attack on residential infrastructure in Kyiv is consistent with the broader pattern of
Russian forces prioritizing creating psychological terror effects on Ukraine over achieving tangible battlefield
effects. US military analyst Brett Friedman observed on October 17 that a Shahed-136's payload is 88 pounds
of explosives, whereas a typical 155mm M795 artillery round carries 23.8 pounds of explosives, which means
that one Shahed-136 drone carries about three shells worth of explosive material but without the consistent
pattern of fragmentation.[4] Friedman suggested that the five Shahed-136s that struck Kyiv had the effect of
15 artillery shells fired at a very large area.[5] Such strikes can do great damage to civilian infrastructure and
kill and wound many people without creating meaningful military effects. This analysis suggests that Russian
forces are continuing to use Shahed-136 drones to generate the psychological effects associated with
targeting civilian areas instead of attempting to generate asymmetric operational effects by striking legitimate
military and frontline targets in a concentrated manner.[6]
A fratricidal altercation between mobilized servicemen at a training ground in Belgorod Oblast on October 15
is likely a consequence of the Kremlin’s continual reliance on ethnic minority communities to bear the burden
of mobilization in the Russian Federation. Russian sources reported that the shooting took place after
mobilized servicemen from Dagestan, Azerbaijan, and Adyghe complained to their commander that the war in
Ukraine is not their war to fight, to which the commander responded that they are fighting a “holy war” and
called Allah a “coward,” causing a fight to break out between Muslim and non-Muslim servicemen.[7] Russian
sources then claimed that three mobilized Tajik servicemen opened fire at the training ground, killing the
commander and both contract and mobilized soldiers.[8] Eyewitnesses claimed that the shooters told Muslim
servicemen to stand aside as they opened fire.[9] The Russian information space immediately responded to
the incident with racialized rhetoric against Central Asians and called for the introduction of a visa regime in
Russia.[10]
Much of the Kremlin’s campaign to avoid general mobilization has fallen along distinct ethnic lines, and ethnic
minority enclaves have largely borne the brunt of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s force generation
efforts.[11] ISW previously reported on the prevalence of volunteer battalions formed in non-Russian ethnic
minority communities, many of which suffered substantial losses upon deployment to Ukraine.[12] This trend
continued following Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization, after which authorities continued to
