1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark
April 5, 6:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Bakhmut to
avoid encirclement if necessary, but do not yet assess the need to do so. Zelensky stated during a press conference
in Poland on April 5 that Ukrainian troops face a very challenging situation in Bakhmut, and that Kyiv will make the
“corresponding decisions” if Ukrainian troops risk encirclement by Russian forces.[1] Zelensky’s statement is in line with
other recent statements by Ukrainian officials that Ukrainian military command will order a withdrawal from Bakhmut
when and if they deem a withdrawal to be the most strategically appropriate option. While it remains to be seen whether
Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut and its efficacy in fixing Russian forces in the area is worth Ukrainian losses (and we will
likely be unable to assess this until observing the Ukrainian spring counteroffensive), Ukrainian military leadership
continues to clearly signal that Ukrainian forces are still not encircled and have the option to withdraw as necessary.[2]
Russian President Vladimir Putin framed Russia’s efforts to consolidate control of occupied territories of
Ukraine as a matter of internal security and rule of law during a meeting with the Russian National
Security Council on April 5. Putin called for the continued economic, legal, and social integration of occupied Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts into the Russian Federation and emphasized the importance of Russian
“restoration” efforts in occupied areas in facilitating the integration process.[3] Putin also accused Ukraine of threatening
civilians in occupied areas and highlighted recent ”terrorist attacks” against occupation officials and law enforcement
agencies, referring to Ukrainian partisan attacks against occupation organs.[4] Putin emphasized the need for intensified
law enforcement operations to guard against such attacks and called for the increased participation of local Ukrainian
citizens in law enforcement processes, explicitly encouraging collaborators and informants in occupied areas. Putin has
notably invoked the concept of “terrorism” and threats to Russian domestic security to justify domestic repressions and is
likely setting conditions for further repressions and law enforcement crackdowns in occupied territories using similar
framing.[5]
Putin also attempted to portray Russia as a respected world power against the backdrop of Chinese
officials downplaying close relations with Russia. Putin held a televised meeting presenting ambassador credentials
to the heads of 17 diplomatic missions on April 5, during which he highlighted Russia’s close relationship with Syria and
cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), likely as part of ongoing Russian efforts to appeal to
non-Western states.[6] Putin stated that Syria is a reliable partner with whom Russia reached several unspecified
agreements during Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's recent trip to Russia on March 14. Putin berated ambassadors from
the United States and European Union states and claimed that the West is responsible for the war in Ukraine and geopolitical
confrontation with Russia.
Chinese Ambassador to the EU Fu Cong stated on April 5 that the Russian–Chinese joint statement declaring there were
“no limits” to their ties released in February 2022 was misrepresented, calling “no limits” a “purely rhetorical
statement.”[7] Fu added that China does not support Russia’s war in Ukraine and is not providing Russia weapons. Fu’s
statement is consistent with ISW’s March 21 assessment that Putin has not been able to secure the benefits from the no-
limits bilateral partnership with China which he likely hoped for when meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow
between March 20 and March 22.[8]
The Kremlin is likely increasingly struggling to maintain loyalty among lower-level regional authorities as
it continues to place the onus on funding the war on Russian federal subjects. Independent Russian
outlet Verstka reported on April 5 that the Kremlin is developing a “program of privileges” in regional administrations to
maintain loyalty among lower-level local officials.[9] Verstka stated that the Russian presidential administration demanded
that regional administrations create “initiative groups” to cater to the needs of regional civil servants, and that regional vice-
governors are being encouraged in an oddly framed measure to install vending machines in administration buildings, secure
preferential bank loans for employees, and offer officials free city parking.[10] Verstka reported that these measures in large
part are meant to mitigate growing discontent about the continued costs of the war.[11] ISW has previously observed that
the Kremlin has repeatedly placed the onus on Russian regional authorities to mobilize and fund the war, and Russian
regions continue to bear the brunt of the Kremlin’s decision-making demographically and economically.[12] Such efforts
