Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 8, 2023
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and
Frederick W. Kagan
April 8, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
Ukrainian and Russian sources discussed the decreased rate of Russian offensive
operations along the entire frontline on April 8, supporting ISW’s assessment that the
overall Russian offensive is approaching culmination.[1] Council of Reservists of the
Ukrainian Ground Forces Head Ivan Tymochko reported on April 8 that Russian forces are fighting
along the entire frontline, but that Russian offensive potential continues to decline and that current
Russian attacks are focused on distracting and dispersing Ukrainian troops in anticipation of
counteroffensive operations.[2] Tymochko stated that Russian forces are not making serious advances
anywhere on the frontline, noting that the pace of attacks in and around Bakhmut has slightly decreased
in some areas and stagnated entirely in others.[3] Tymochko also assessed that the Russian offensive
on Avdiivka has “choked” and reported that Russian forces still do not control Marinka despite having
reduced the city to rubble.[4] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the pace of Russian
offensive operations along the entire Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline has decreased over the past day
and emphasized that Russian forces are struggling to advance anywhere in Ukraine.[5] Several Russian
commentators are emphasizing Russian preparations for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive,
suggesting that the overall focus of the Russian information space is shifting away from discussing
Russian offensive capabilities and towards assessing Ukraine’s potential to regain significant
ground.[6]
The dynamics of battlefield artillery usage in Ukraine reflect the fact that Russian forces
are using artillery to offset their degraded offensive capabilities. Former Donetsk People’s
Republic (DNR) Security Minister and current Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky
reported that the Russian command has decided to stop the daily issue of ammunition to areas of the
front where there are no active offensive operations almost entirely.[7] Khodakovsky noted that the
artillery shortage on the frontline results in part from preparations for a Ukrainian
counteroffensive.[8] Khodakovsky’s statement indicates that the Russian command must prioritize
artillery ammunition supplies rigorously due to shortages. High demand for shells indicates that
Russian forces are still heavily relying on artillery to offset key shortcomings in combat capability,
including poor Russian targeting skills, insufficient ground assault capabilities, and inadequate
availability of airpower in Ukraine. Russian forces use heavy artillery barrages to flatten settlements
before seizing them with ground attacks, offsetting the need to conduct effective infantry attacks or to
conduct an airstrike using scarce precision munitions and putting airframes and pilots at risk of
Ukrainian air defenses. Continuing Russian shortages in artillery ammunition will undermine the
Russian military’s ability to continue offsetting its other weaknesses and limitations. The Washington
Post reported on April 8 that by contrast, Ukrainian forces are using one-third as many shells as
