1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2023
Riley Bailey, George Barros, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Angela
Howard, and Mason Clark
April 4, 7pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map
archive monthly.
The Kremlin will likely attempt to coerce Belarus into further Union State integration
when Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander
Lukashenko meet in Moscow on April 5 and 6. The Kremlin announced on April 4 that Putin
and Lukashenko will meet for private bilateral discussions on April 5 and attend a meeting of the
Supreme State Council of the Union State in Moscow on April 6.
The Kremlin stated that the Union
State Supreme State Council meeting will address the implementation of the Union State Treaty
through 28 different Union State programs from 2021 to 2023 —likely the package of 28 integration
roadmaps that Lukashenko ratified in November 2021.
The Kremlin stated that Russian and
Belarusian officials also plan to agree on other unspecified “practical issues of further integration,”
possibly in the area of intelligence sharing, as Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director
Sergey Naryshkin met with Lukashenko in Minsk and discussed Russian-Belarusian intelligence
sharing on April 4.
The Kremlin may pressure Belarus for more integration concessions under the
rubric of defending the Union State from claimed Western military and/or terrorist threats.
The Kremlin continues to attempt to employ nuclear threats to deter Western military
aid provisions to Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s planned counteroffensive. Russian Defense
Minister Sergey Shoigu justified Russia’s decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus by
accusing NATO of intensifying combat training and reconnaissance activities near the Russian and
Belarusian borders and accused the West of escalating the war in Ukraine by providing additional
military aid to Ukraine on April 4.
Shoigu reinforced existing Russian nuclear threats by stating that
Belarus has nuclear-capable attack aircraft and nuclear strike-capable Iskander-M systems.
Shoigu
also stated that Belarusian missile forces began training in Russia to operate Iskander-M systems,
including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, on April 3.
Shoigu’s statements do not present any new
information on Belarusian training and are likely part of an information operation. ISW previously
reported that Belarusian servicemen were training with Iskander systems in Russia as of February
2023.
Shoigu’s reinvigorated nuclear blackmail rhetoric coincides with Finland joining NATO and a
new US aid package to Ukraine.
ISW continues to assess that the risk of nuclear escalation remains
extremely low and that Russian deployments of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus are highly unlikely
to affect battlefield realities in Ukraine.
Russian-deployed nuclear weapons in Belarus additionally
will almost certainly remain under the control of Russian personnel permanently deployed in Belarus.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s demonstrative response to the
assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky) indicates
