Institute for the Study of War and
the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 1, 2023
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 1, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the
Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-
terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW
will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian, Ukrainian, and Western sources observed on April 1 that the
Russian winter offensive has failed to achieve the Kremlin’s goals of seizing
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by March 31. Chief of
the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov had announced on December 22 that Russian
forces were focusing most of their efforts on seizing Donetsk Oblast, and Russian forces
launched their winter offensive operation in early February along the Kupyansk-Svatove-
Kreminna-Lyman line and on select frontlines in western Donetsk Oblast.
1
The UK
Ministry of Defense (MoD) observed that Gerasimov has failed to extend Russian control
over Donbas during his appointment as the theater commander in Ukraine and has
achieved only marginal gains by expending mobilized personnel.
2
Ukrainian intelligence
representative Andriy Yusov stated that Gerasimov missed the Kremlin’s deadline to
capture Donbas by March 31.
3
Russian milbloggers fretted that Russian forces must finish their offensive operations in
Bakhmut and Avdiivka to prepare for the Ukrainian counteroffensives they expect
between Orthodox Easter on April 16 and Soviet Labor Day on May 9.
4
Milbloggers
highlighted their disappointment that there have not been any decisive battles throughout
the winter and observed that Russia will not be capable of continuing a large-scale
offensive operation if it is unable to secure Bakhmut and Avdiivka in the coming weeks.
Deputy Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) in
occupied Donetsk Oblast Alexander Khodakovsky stated that he agrees with former
theater commander Army General Sergey Surovikin that Russia needs to shift to defensive
positions.
5
(ISW is not aware of any publicly reported statement Surovikin has made
along these lines) Khodakovsky noted that failures during the offensive cause manpower
losses and spark negative sentiments among the personnel, and argued that unnamed
actors may be attempting to continue the offensive for personal reasons rather than taking
a rational approach to the issue. Khodakovsky’s comment likely implies that Gerasimov
is pursuing personal interest in sustaining the offensive in order to retain favor with
Russian President Vladimir Putin. Khodakovsky’s recent appointment on March 30 as
regional Rosgvardia deputy head and the return of Surovikin (at least by proxy) to the
information space may indicate that Gerasimov’s unsuccessful theater-wide offensive
may already be costing him favor with Putin.
