1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 28, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
March 28, 6:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Wagner Group forces have likely taken the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and continue
to make gains within the city. Russian milbloggers widely claimed on March 28 that Wagner fighters have captured the
AZOM complex and are working to clear the area of remaining Ukrainian forces.[1] These claims are relatively consistent
with available visual evidence of Russian presence in the AZOM complex. Geolocated footage posted on March 26 shows a
military correspondent from Russian outlet RIA Novosti moving around the territory of the complex with apparent ease,
indicating that Wagner likely controls enough of the plant to host media personalities in relative safety.[2] RIA
Novosti correspondent Sergei Shilov additionally visited AZOM on March 28 and indicated that fighting has now moved to
the industrial zone south of AZOM.[3] Several Russian milbloggers also claimed on March 28 that Wagner fighters have
advanced closer to Bakhmut’s city center, taken control of the city market, and reached the Palace of Culture.[4] These
claims are plausible considering geolocated visual evidence of Wagner’s advances towards the city center posted on March
28, as well as combat footage of Ukrainian infantry engaging in small arms exchanges with Russian forces near the Palace
of Culture and central market area in Bakhmut city’s center.[5] Wagner is likely working to consolidate gains in northern
and central Bakhmut to push towards the city center and expand its zone of control into western Bakhmut. ISW assesses
that Russian forces have advanced into an additional five percent of Bakhmut in the last seven days and that they currently
occupy roughly 65 percent of the city.
Russian and Ukrainian sources speculated that Lieutenant General Sergei Kuzmenko will replace Colonel
General Rustam Muradov as Eastern Military District (EMD) commander.[6] Kuzmenko previously served as
the commander of the 6th Combined Arms Army from 2015 to 2019 and more recently as a department head at the Russian
Armed Forces General Staff Academy.[7] Kuzmenko has never held a command position comparable to the role of a military
district commander, and his appointment as EMD commander would be an unusual step. Russian military authorities
reportedly dismissed Muradov due to battlefield failures and significant losses in western Donetsk Oblast, and Kuzmenko
would likely inherit expectations to reverse the total lack of progress in the EMD’s zone of responsibility in Ukraine.[8] There
is no indication that Kuzmenko would be better equipped to succeed in overseeing offensive operations in western Donetsk
Oblast with even further degraded forces than the more experienced Muradov. ISW has not observed any confirmation that
Russian military officials have dismissed Muradov as EMD commander or that Kuzmenko has assumed the role.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be using his influence in Russia’s mainstream media
landscape to present himself as a contender in Russia’s 2024 presidential elections. Prigozhin’s own Federal
News Agency published an interview that Prigozhin conducted with Russian journalists from Russia Today, RIA
Novosti and Federal News Agency on March 14.[9] This interview was noteworthy for its unique format--during the
interview Prigozhin seemed to mimic the way that Russian President Vladimir Putin films his choreographed public
meetings, either to mock Putin quietly or to suggest subtly that Prigozhin could become Russian president like Putin. The
choreography and staging of Prigozhin’s interview places Prigozhin in the camera’s frame at Prigozhin’s desk across from
his audience in the same way that Putin’s filmed meetings and photo ops usually do.[10] This film style is unusual for
Prigozhin, as Prigozhin’s public video statements typically do not employ such a sterile format; Prigozhin has usually opted
to film himself with wide shots on battlefields or in dynamic but staged videos that strive to appear candid and
gritty.[11] Prigozhin also used this interview to reiterate his previous arguments about the need to instill hardline ideology
in Russian fighters and insinuate that the Russian Ministry of Defense is deliberately depriving the Wagner Group of artillery
ammunition.[12]
Prigozhin may seek to parody Putin’s cinematography style as part of a larger trolling campaign to attack the Kremlin or
draw tacit parallels between Prigozhin and the office of the Russian presidency. Prigozhin has previously insinuated that he
could replace Putin. Prigozhin made a sarcastic announcement on March 11 that he will run for the Ukrainian presidency in
2024 — a statement that a prominent Kremlin-linked Russian scholar argued implicitly promoted a narrative that Prigozhin
would run in Russia’s presidential elections which are also scheduled for 2024.[13] Prigozhin directly attacked Putin’s
presidential administration on January 18 and insinuated that some officials working there are traitors who want Russia to
lose the war in Ukraine — one of Prigozhin’s boldest attacks against the Kremlin to date.[14] Prigozhin also denied the
Kremlin’s claims that Russia is fighting NATO in Ukraine and questioned whether there are actually Nazis in Ukraine as the
