Institute for the Study of War &
The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 27, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Layne Philipson,
Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan
January 27, 7:40 ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin is
preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative that may begin as early as February or
March 2023. Russian officials, Kremlin advisors, and other unspecified knowledgeable figures who
spoke on condition of anonymity reportedly told Bloomberg that Putin seeks to conduct a new major
offensive and that he believes that Russia’s tolerance to accept causalities will allow Russia to win the
war in the long run despite Russian failures so far.
This report is consistent with ISW’s current
assessment and forecast that the Kremlin is likely preparing to conduct a decisive strategic action—
most likely in Luhansk Oblast—in the next six months intended to regain the initiative and end
Ukraine’s current string of operational successes.
ISW previously assessed that the decisive strategic
action in Luhansk Oblast could be either a major offensive or a Russian defensive operation to defeat
and exploit a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Recent limited Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast may be intended to disperse Ukrainian
forces and set conditions for an offensive in Luhansk.
Russia is redeploying elements of the 2nd
Motorized Rifle Division from Belarus to Luhansk Oblast.
This recent development suggests that the
planned Russian offensive referenced in the Bloomberg report is most likely aimed at Luhansk Oblast
though it could also occur in the Vuhledar area in western Donetsk. This new offensive is extremely
unlikely to target northern Ukraine from Belarus. There continues to be no indication that Russian
forces are forming strike groups in Belarus; Russian elements in Belarus are largely using Belarusian
infrastructure and training capacity for training rotations.
Russian milbloggers are also increasingly
writing off the notion of a second attack against Kyiv as an information operation and are suggesting
that the most likely target for a Russian offensive would be in eastern Ukraine or neighboring Kharkiv
Oblast.
The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive
pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson
Dmitry Peskov stated on January 27 that he cannot provide additional information about presidential
decrees on pardons because they are protected by "various classifications of secrecy."
Peskov’s
statement confirms that Putin has been issuing preemptive presidential pardons to convicts, the
majority of whom are likely recruited into the ranks of the Wagner Group. Russian Human Rights
Council member Eva Merkacheva stated in early January that convicts recruited by Wagner are
pardoned before their release from penal colonies.
ISW previously assessed that these preemptive
presidential pardons may be driving further recruitment within penal colonies and likely empower
Wagner to operate with greater impunity in the theater.
A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities
are deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea. Russian
opposition outlet Verstka examined photos posted to an "Adoption in Moscow Oblast" website that
showed 14 children aged two to five from Kherson Oblast at the Yolochka orphanage in Simferopol,
