An Analysis of Israel’s Counter-Hezbollah Strategy
Luke Baumgartner
Israel’s four-decade struggle against the Shi’a terrorist group Hezbollah has largely failed to
produce positive results for the Jewish state. Since Hezbollah’s emergence in the early 1980s,
their broad cross-sectarian appeal within Lebanon and vast financial support from the Islamic
Republic of Iran continue to present a challenge to the Israeli state security apparatus. Having
consolidated support of the historically disenfranchised Lebanese Shi’a population and with vast
amounts of funding from Iran and a worldwide Shi’a diaspora, Hezbollah solidified itself as the
vanguard of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the primary bulwark against Israeli aggression.
Following the failed assassination attempt of an Israeli diplomat in 1982, Israel launched a full-
scale invasion of southern Lebanon as a means of finally defeating the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, providing the stimulus for the various Shi’a militant groups simultaneously
fighting sectarian militias as well as the Lebanese Army in the midst of a bloody civil war.
During the course of Israel’s subsequent 18-year occupation of Southern Lebanon,
Hezbollah’s terrorist tactics evolved, eventually transforming the group into an insurgent army
whose sole aim was to expel Israeli troops from Lebanon and implement traditional Islamic law.
The Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) strategy to confront Hezbollah during the course of their
occupation experienced persistent change; frequent changes in military leadership strained
Israel’s civil-military relations and failed to produce a coherent strategy that adapted to
Hezbollah’s changing tactics.
In the years since Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000, the
lessons learned from their nearly twenty-year war as well as the shorter armed conflict against
Hezbollah in 2006 failed to materialize. With domestic political turmoil and a resolute Iranian
source of funding to Hezbollah, Israel’s strategy to counter Hezbollah’s political influence in
Lebanon and its formidable military wing face continued difficulties for the foreseeable future.
Introduction
For nearly four decades, Israel has been
engaged in a perpetual–albeit sometimes
sporadic–war of attrition against Hezbollah,
or the “Party of God.” Hezbollah first
appeared as a loose confederation of
disgruntled, politicized Shi’a fighting
against the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) and other militias for
control of southern Lebanon in the early
1970s. Following Israel’s invasion of
southern Lebanon in June 1982, Hezbollah
established itself as the preeminent Shi’a
militant group fighting the “Zionist
occupiers,” beating out the likes of the
secular, former co-belligerent from which
they split, Amal.
Now a significant force in
Lebanese politics as part of the March 8
Alliance, Hezbollah primarily exists to
provide essential services to its constituents
while simultaneously serving the regional
interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran
through a three-pronged approach,
encompassing military, political, and
religious pretexts and representing a
perpetual thorn in the side of the Jewish
state.
The cornerstone of Israel’s strategic
doctrine—strength through deterrence—is
preventing large-scale conventional wars
Georgetown Security Studies Review
