OCTOBER 2022 CTC SENTINEL 1
A fragile U.N.-brokered ceasefire between the Houthis
and their military opponents in Yemen’s Presidential
Leadership Council (PLC) held from April to October
2022 but has now lapsed. The Houthis hold the key to
an enduring ceasefire in Yemen, and can threaten the
stability of Red Sea shipping lanes and the security of
the United States and its partners in the Middle East. All
these considerations necessitate a fuller understanding
of the Houthi political-military leadership, its core
motivations, and the nature and extent of Iranian and
Lebanese Hezbollah influence within the movement.
This study argues that the Houthi movement is now more
centralized and cohesive than ever, in part due to close
mentoring from Lebanese Hezbollah and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Houthi Jihad Council is
emerging as a remarkable partner for Iran and the Houthi-
Iran relationship and should no longer be viewed as a
relationship of necessity, but rather a strong, deep-rooted
alliance that is underpinned by tight ideological anity
and geopolitical alignment. The emergence of a ‘southern
Hezbollah’ is arguably now a fact on the ground.
I
n September 2018, one of the authors of this article
published an analysis of the military evolution of the Houthi
movement
a
in CTC Sentinel, noting the group’s very rapid
five-year development from an insurgent group fielding
roadside bombs to a state-level actor using medium-range
ballistic missiles.
1
Since then, the Houthis have further consolidated
their hold over the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and the Red Sea coast
port city of Hodeida, and nearly won the civil war with a sustained
(but ultimately indecisive) military oensive against Yemen’s oil
and gas hub at Ma’rib.
2
On January 19, 2021, the outgoing Trump
administration designated the Houthi organizational institution
Ansar Allah as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), a step that the
Biden administration almost immediately revoked on February 16,
a Salmoni, Loidolt, and Wells noted that the Houthis are known by a variety
of names: “the ‘Huthis’ (al-Huthiyin), the ‘Huthi movement’ (al-Haraka
al-Huthiya), ‘Huthist elements’ (al-‘anasir al-Huthiya), ‘Huthi supporters’
(Ansar al-Huthi), or ‘Believing Youth Elements’ (‘Anasir al-Shabab al-
Mu’min).” Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime
and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica:
RAND, 2010), p. 189.
2021.
3
Some Houthi leaders remained covered by older sanctions
4
b
(and additional Houthi military leaders continue to be added to
U.S. sanctions lists) for posing a “threat to the peace, security, or
stability of Yemen.”
5
A fragile U.N.-brokered ceasefire between the Houthis and their
military opponents in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council
(PLC)
6
held from April to October 2022 but has (at the time of
writing) lapsed,
7
c
and the path to long-term conflict resolution
remains unclear. As a rebel force now in control of much of the
Yemeni state, the Houthis will likely be required to give up some of
their gains in return for an enduring peace, and such a peace may
not be welcomed by the Houthis’ strongest backers in the war—
namely Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.
d
The Houthis continue to
pose a military and counterterrorism threat to the United States
b The U.S. government noted: “Ansarallah leaders Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim remain
sanctioned under E.O. 13611 related to acts that threaten the peace,
security, or stability of Yemen.” “Revocation of the Terrorist Designations of
Ansarallah,” U.S. Department of State, February 12, 2021.
c The truce was up for renewal on October 2 but had not (at the time
of publication) been renewed immediately and thus lapsed, perhaps
temporarily.
d The Saudi and Gulf military commitment in Yemen gives a competitive
advantage to Iran, forcing Gulf missile defenses and other resources to
be deployed away from the Gulf littoral shared with Iran and toward a new
western and southern front. The Yemen war is a geopolitical lever on the
Saudis that Iran, through its support to the Houthis, may be in a position to
manipulate. See Gerald M. Feierstein, “Iran’s Role in Yemen and Prospects
for Peace,” Middle East Institute, December 6, 2018, and Thomas Juneau,
“How Iran Helped Houthis Expand Their Reach,” War on the Rocks, August
23, 2021.
Dr. Michael Knights is the Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow with the
Military and Security Program at The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy. He has traveled extensively in Yemen since 2006.
Twitter: @mikeknightsiraq
Adnan al-Gabarni is a Yemeni journalist specializing in military
and security aairs. He previously worked for Al Masdar Online.
Twitter: @Aljbrnyadnan
Casey Coombs is a researcher at the Sana’a Center for Strategic
Studies. He was based in Yemen in 2012-2015 as a freelance
journalist. Twitter: @Macoombs
© 2022 Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, Casey Coombs
e Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control
in ‘the Other Hezbollah’
By Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs
