While careful analysis of the likelihood and consequences of the failure of nuclear
deterrence is not usually undertaken in formulating national security strategy,
general perception of the risk of nuclear war has a strong influence on the broad
directions of national policy. For example, arguments for both national missile
defenses and deep reductions in nuclear forces depend in no small part on judgments
that deterrence is unreliable. However, such judgments are usually based on intuition,
rather than on a synthesis of the most appropriate analytic methods that can be
brought to bear. This work attempts to establish a methodological basis for more
rigorously addressing the question: What is the risk of nuclear war? Our goals are to
clarify the extent to which this is a researchable question and to explore promising
analytic approaches. We focus on four complementary approaches to likelihood
assessment: historical case study, elicitation of expert knowledge, probabilistic risk
assessment, and the application of complex systems theory. We also evaluate the
state of knowledge for assessing both the physical and intangible consequences of
nuclear weapons use. Finally, we address the challenge of integrating knowledge
derived from such disparate approaches.
ON ASSESSING THE RISK OF
Edited by James Scouras
Edited by James Scouras
ON ASSESSING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR
NUCLEAR WAR
Cover: The Oracle at Delphi by the Kodros painter, c. 440–430 BCE. The oracle, speaking for the god Apollo, was
known for providing authoritative, yet enigmatic, responses to questions regarding power, religion, and war.
