SAMUEL CHARAP, KHRYSTYNA HOLYNSKA
Russia’s War Aims in
Ukraine
Objective-Setting and the Kremlin’s Use
of Force Abroad
R
ussia’s war in Ukraine is Moscow’s most significant use of force outside its borders since
World War II. Even in the early stages of its full-scale invasion, which began in February
2022, the operation entailed by far the largest commitment of ground forces in decades,
and the scale of military resources devoted to the war has grown significantly since then. In
short, the stakes for Russia could not be higher.
Despite these stakes, the Kremlin did not offer a coherent public narrative on the objectives of
the operation. Often, goals were simply not articulated; when they were, vague concepts were used
that allowed significant room for interpretation. Senior Russian leaders regularly made contradic-
tory claims about the goals, often
even contradicting themselves. It is
true that statesmen often dissemble
in public about what they hope to
accomplish in foreign policy: In par-
ticular, Russian President Vladimir
Putin is notorious for his untruths,
particularly when denying his coun-
try’s violation of a commitment or
norm. However, it is remarkable that
the Russian leadership has not told
either the public or the troops in
clear terms what Moscow is trying to
achieve in its most consequential use
of force abroad in several generations.
Such confusion about objectives
contradicts a core tenet of Russian
strategy; namely, the necessity to link
political goals and military action.
KEY FINDINGS
■ Russian strategists recognize the importance of clear, publicly
articulated objectives when using military force.
■ Russian strategists emphasize the need to adjust political
objectives to realities on the ground.
■ Since 2014, Russia’s military operations abroad have either been
deniable and semi-covert (Crimea and the Donbas); when its
operations are acknowledged and overt (Syria), such operations
are accompanied by a clearly stated objective.
■ Moscow’s failure to consistently articulate a coherent objective
in the first year of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine deviates from
both the postulates of Russian military science and the country’s
past practice since 2014.
■ Russian military and political leaders have pronounced objectives
for the war in Ukraine, but those objectives have been numerous
and have varied significantly in the first year of the war.
Research Report
