OCTOBER 2024
Trusted Chips
Why the Discussion Risks Distracting
from Solving Policy Issues
By Andreas Schumacher
Introduction
The United States and its allies have taken signicant actions to promote the de-risking of
semiconductor supply chains. Protecting and controlling these supply chains also remain critical
components of national and economic security discussions. To achieve this holistically, several
sometimes-conicting goals need to be met:
1. Critical technologies and products need to be controlled.
2. Export control sanctions must be enforced.
3. Sensitive information must be safeguarded against attacks through compromised chips.
4. Overreliance on nonmarket actors must be avoided.
5. A competitive, commercially viable semiconductor supply must be ensured.
Many of these policy goals have been recently subsumed under a general call for “trusted” or
“trustworthy” chips. In reality, the goals are varied and complex, and trade-os are unavoidable. For
example, adding security features will increase costs and might not be technically feasible for most
semiconductors.
Without specic, clearly dened, and aligned policy goals—along with an appreciation of the
technological boundary conditions and an understanding of the economic impacts along the supply
chain—the discussions among the United States and its allies are unlikely to yield meaningful results.
“Trusted chips” will continue to mean dierent things to dierent stakeholders, detracting from solving
the underlying issues.
This white paper oers three recommendations for policymakers to address pertinent questions about
the semiconductor supply chain:
