https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated October 3, 2024
China: Nuclear and Missile Proliferation
The U.S. government has for decades expressed concerns
about China’s proliferation of nuclear- and missile-related
technologies to other countries, with more recent focus on
the threat of Chinese acquisition of U.S.-origin nuclear
technology. (See CRS In Focus IF11050, New U.S. Policy
Regarding Nuclear Exports to China, by Paul K. Kerr and
Mary Beth D. Nikitin.) Official U.S. government sources
indicate that the Chinese government has ended its direct
involvement in the transfer of nuclear- and missile-related
items, but China-based companies and individuals continue
to export goods relevant to those items, particularly to Iran
and North Korea. U.S. officials have also raised concerns
about entities operating in China that provide other forms of
support for proliferation-sensitive activities, such as illicit
finance and money laundering.
Background
China did not oppose new states’ acquisition of nuclear
weapons during the 1960s and 1970s, the Department of
State wrote in a declassified January 1998 report to
Congress. According to a 1983 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), China had exported “nuclear materials
since 1981” that were not subject to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Beijing did so “mainly
to earn hard currency,” the estimate assesses, explaining
that the
Chinese became aware in 1979 that they had
insufficient resources for their initially grandiose
modernization program and that they needed to
generate more revenue through expanded foreign
trade. Accordingly, the State Council directed its
subordinate ministries in late 1979 to begin selling
surpluses.
Consequently, according to the NIE, Beijing ended its
“abstention from commercial trade in conventional arms
and nuclear materials.” During the 1980s and 1990s, China
transferred nuclear and missile technology to other
countries’ weapons programs. China provided assistance to
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and engaged in
nuclear cooperation with Iran. Beijing exported missiles to
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. (For more information,
see CRS Report RL33192, U.S.-China Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement, by Mark Holt, Mary Beth D.
Nikitin, and Paul K. Kerr.)
According to U.S. government reports and official
statements, China significantly curtailed its nuclear- and
missile-related transfers during the 1990s; Beijing also
committed to improving the government’s export controls.
For example, the above-cited 1998 State Department report
notes China’s 1996 pledge to refrain from assisting
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, Beijing’s 1997 changes to
Chinese nuclear export policy, and other Chinese
nonproliferation efforts.
The United States has extensive nuclear cooperation with
China, which is governed by a civil nuclear cooperation
agreement, renewed in 2015. (See CRS Report RL33192,
U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.) The above-
described changes in Chinese behavior took place after the
two governments concluded their first nuclear cooperation
agreement in 1985. Laws subsequently adopted by
Congress required, as a condition for U.S. implementation
of the agreement, the President to submit to Congress
certain nonproliferation-related certifications, as well as a
report about Beijing’s “nonproliferation policies and
practices.” President William Clinton stated in a January
1998 letter to Congress that China had “made substantial
strides in joining the international nonproliferation regime,
and in putting in place a comprehensive system of nuclear-
related, nationwide export controls,” since concluding the
1985 agreement.
Beijing acceded in 1992 to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear-weapon state (NWS) and has
voluntary IAEA safeguards on its civil reactors. The treaty
defines NWS as those that exploded a nuclear weapon or
other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967:
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. All other NPT states-parties are nonnuclear-weapon
states. According to the treaty, a NWS is not to transfer
nuclear weapons to “any recipient whatsoever” or to “in
any way … assist, encourage, or induce any” nonnuclear-
weapon state “to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons.”
China is also a participant in the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG)—a multilateral control regime for nuclear-related
exports. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
performs an analogous function for missiles and related
items. China is not an MTCR partner but has agreed to
adhere to the regime’s export guidelines.
The Chinese government has continued to express support
for the international arms control and nonproliferation
regime. Fu Cong, Director General of the Department of
Arms Control of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated
during a December 2020 conference that “China is ready to
enhance non-proliferation policy exchanges and
cooperation with all countries.” More recently, China’s
Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs Shen Jian declared in
an August 26, 2023, statement to the Conference on
Disarmament that China “will join hands with other
delegations to preserve and strengthen existing multilateral
arms control, disarmament and Non-Proliferation
institutions.”
