Vol. 54, September 2024
Foreword
I originally wrote this primer on U.S.
nuclear deterrence nearly seven years ago
as a means to educate the public on the
importance of this enterprise, which is
critical to our existential interests. While
much has changed in the global landscape
over that time, one thing, unfortunately, has
not: U.S. nuclear forces have not been fully
reconstituted and remain unmodernized.
Some steps toward progress have been
made, namely the amazing progress on
the B-21 Raider program and the LGM-35A
Sentinel ICBM Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent program. It is imperative now
these programs receive the support and
resources they require to succeed, as they
cannot falter—this is a no-fail mission.
It is my hope that this primer, with a few
updates, continues to help educate on the
importance of nuclear deterrence, as it
underpins not only our national security,
but global security for all nations.
Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (Ret.)
A version of this essay first appeared in
Strategic
Studies Quarterly
vol. 11, no 4, Winter 2017.
Many Americans and some in the U.S. military will never
have the opportunity to be educated on the nuclear deterrent—
will not ever find time to ponder why we have it or to understand
what its utility is today and in the future. However, understanding
the essence of nuclear deterrence is important regardless of one’s
military service, branch, or career field because nuclear weapons
are the ultimate guarantor of U.S. military power and security, and
understanding how they fulfill this role should be fundamental to
any practitioner of the profession of arms.
Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, along with
the dramatic reduction in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, the
deterioration of the infrastructure to support the remaining stockpile,
and the aging of the delivery systems that constitute the triad, there
has been a dearth of attention paid to the rationale for the nuclear
deterrent. e underlying principles and rationale for the deterrent
have not gone away, but we have stopped educating, thinking, and
debating, with informed underpinnings, the necessity and role of the
U.S. nuclear deterrent in today’s world. Even more concerning has
been the lack of informed debate on the subject. We have raised three
generations of Air Force officers who may not have been exposed to the
most fundamental and yet relevant arguments surrounding deterrence
from the late nuclear theorists Herman Kahn and omas Schelling.
When you stop thinking about something, typically what
follows is you stop investing in it. When you stop investing in it, the
people expected to perform the mission lose focus, morale declines,
and some bad things can happen, such as the unintentional movement
of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force
Base in 2007.
1
It is hard to imagine that the series of failures that led
up to this event could ever have happened during the Cold War given
the intense focus the Air Force had on the nuclear mission. But, as
a former commander of Strategic Air Command observed when
referring to this incident, the unintentional movement was probably
Introduction
On U.S. Nuclear Deterrence
by Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (Ret.)
Explorer Chair, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence (MI-SPACE)
MITCHELL INSTITUTE
Policy Paper
