INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, and especially since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Arctic has become increas-
ingly characterized by competition rather than coopera-
tion.
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As described by Icelandic Prime Minister Bjarni
Benediktsson in October 2024, “whether we like it or not,
the Arctic is fast becoming a theater of global competi-
tion and militarization, and it is up to us to determine the
parameters for developing this region.”
2
The Arctic secu-
rity environment has changed politically, reective of an
increasingly competitive posture between a consolidated
NATO bloc in the West and a belligerent Russia in the East.
Prominent among the political challenges facing NATO
allies in the Arctic is addressing these changes materi-
ally. The issue is comprehensive and involves combining
means in order to underpin deterrence—of both warfare
and gray-zone actions—as well as to prepare for potential
warghting scenarios. In responding to these challenges,
Arctic states have an opportunity to learn from, and lever-
age, lessons from Ukraine on the role of technological
development in contemporary warfare.
The Ukrainian battleeld has illustrated the strengths
and limitations of several rapidly evolving technologies
impacting the character of warfare. While some techno-
logical solutions have provided robust military advantages
(e.g., the Starlink constellation) others have been caught in
action-reaction cycles where advantages have been quickly
neutralized by the adversary (e.g., certain congurations
of drones or precision-guided artillery).
3
These lessons are
already inuencing the strategies and force postures of
Arctic states, including Russia.
4
Any response to the changing Arctic security environ-
ment requires addressing several key concerns. The rst
is analyzing the vulnerabilities that impede the ability of
Arctic states to credibly and capably both deter and ght
in the High North. At least partially due to the absence
THE ISSUE
The Arctic is quickly becoming a theater of global competition—a development that has accelerated since Russia’s 2022 invasion
of Ukraine. In order to protect critical undersea communications infrastructure, decrease intra-alliance dependency on U.S.
space-based capabilities, and deter Russian gray-zone tactics, NATO-aligned Arctic states—the United States, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—must enhance situational awareness of these vulnerabilities. By applying lessons
learned from the war in Ukraine on how technological advancements can shape military stratey and the operational environ-
ment, specically with regards resilient space capabilities, cost-ecient unmanned systems, and rapid procurement processes
for evolving technological capabilities, Arctic states can improve both deterrence and potential warghting in the region.
DECEMBER 2024By Jonas Berge and Max Bergmann
Addressing Arctic Vulnerabilities
Lessons from Ukraine
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