https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated November 19, 2021
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
can seek counsel from his military advisors; those advisors
are then required to transmit and implement the orders
authorizing nuclear use. But, as General John Hyten, then
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), noted, his job is to give advice, while the
authority to order a launch lies with the President.
General Milley, the current Commander of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS), made a similar point in a memo he
provided to Congress in September 2021. He noted that he
is a part of the “chain of communication,” in his role as the
President’s primary military advisor, but he is not in the
“chain of command” for authorizing a nuclear launch. He
also noted that, if the President ordered a launch, the CJCS
would participate in a “decision conference” to authenticate
the presidential orders and to ensure that the President was
“fully informed” about the implications of the launch.
The President, however, does not need the concurrence of
either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the
launch of nuclear weapons. Neither the military nor
Congress can overrule these orders. As former
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
noted, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
military to execute the order.
The Nuclear Command and Control
System (NCCS)
According to DOD’s Nuclear Matters Handbook, the
elements of the nuclear command and control system
(NCCS) “support the President, through his military
commanders, in exercising presidential authority over U.S.
nuclear weapons operations.” The system relies on “a
collection of activities, processes, and procedures
performed by appropriate military commanders and support
personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”
Specifically, the NCCS provides the President “with the
means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.”
The NCCS collects information on threats to the United
States, communicates that information to the President,
advises the President on response options, communicates
the President’s chosen response to the forces in the field,
and controls the targeting and application of those forces.
Within this system, radars, satellites, and processing
systems provide “unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely,
survivable, and enduring” warning about attacks on the
United States, its allies, and its forces overseas. If these
capabilities identified an attack or an anomalous event, the
President would participate in an emergency
communications conference with the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military
advisors. They would offer the President details and an
assessment of the possible incoming attack, while the
STRATCOM commander would explain the President’s
options for a retaliatory attack.
The President would then evaluate and respond to this
information and decide whether to authorize the use of U.S.
nuclear weapons. He would communicate his choices and
provide this authorization through a communications device
known as the nuclear “football”—a suitcase carried by a
military aid who is always near the President. The suitcase
is equipped with communication tools and a book with
prepared war plans for certain targets. The President could
choose from these prepared plans or, time permitting, ask
STRATCOM to prepare an alternative.
If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack,
he would identify himself to military officials at the
Pentagon with codes unique to him. These codes are
recorded on an ID card, known as the “biscuit,” that the
President carries at all times. Once identified, he would
transmit the launch order to the Pentagon and
STRATCOM. The Secretary of Defense would possibly
contribute to the process by confirming that the order came
from the President, but this role could also be filled by an
officer in the National Military Command Center at the
Pentagon. STRATCOM would implement the order by
preparing to launch the weapons needed for the selected
option. According to Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S.
command and control, once the order is “transmitted to the
war room, they would execute it in a minute or so.” If an
immediate response was selected, “the (land-based)
Minuteman missiles will fire in two minutes. The
submarines will fire in 15 minutes.” Blair also noted that
there is no way to reverse the order.
Options for Nuclear Use
Because this system was designed during the Cold war, it
was, as former director of the CIA General Michael Hayden
noted, “designed for speed and decisiveness. It’s not
designed to debate the decision.” Long-range missiles
attacking the United States from Russian territory could
reach U.S. territory in around 30 minutes; sea-based
systems deployed closer to U.S. shores might arrive in half
that time. If the United States wanted to retaliate before
U.S. weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and
control system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire
process of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding,
and launching would have to take place in less than that
