THE RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD AND
THE FUTURE U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM
Remarks at National Defense University Capitol Hill Breakfast Seminar Series
Thomas P. D’Agostino
National Nuclear Security Administration
May 9, 2007
I appreciate the opportunity to speak before you today. My remarks focus on the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program and our vision for the future nuclear weapons complex
infrastructure—we call it Complex 2030. Initially, I will take a step back and describe how the
period since the end of the Cold War has shaped where we are today, and where we are heading
in the U.S. nuclear weapons program including efforts to “transform” the stockpile and
supporting infrastructure. To set this context, I address five key questions:
• What was the nature of the nuclear weapons enterprise during the Cold War?
• What was our original strategy for sustaining the stockpile and supporting infrastructure?
• Why do we need to adjust that strategy and why now?
• What is our emerging game plan for a revised strategy? and
• How is our RRW strategy consistent with non-proliferation and arms control?
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons programs were undertaken in reaction to a clear and
present danger to the nation’s survival posed by a hostile Soviet Union. They involved large,
multi-billion dollar, development and production programs for both nuclear weapons delivery
systems and the warheads themselves. There was intense and sustained attention and scrutiny to
these programs by senior government officials—both civilian and military. The uniformed
services had a strong and prestigious career path for officers involved in nuclear weapons R&D,
planning, and operations. There was sustained, widespread interest and support within
Congress’ leadership and rank and file. More generally, there was a reasonably robust bipartisan
consensus that nuclear weapons, in large part, were essential to our nation’s security,
notwithstanding disagreements at the margins and strong debate on the details.
