Strategic Deterrence and
US Nuclear Weapons Policy
Recommendations
• Many participants were convinced that the United States has paid a high price for
not being more supportive of nuclear disarmament. They said the United States
would probably get more international cooperation in holding aiders and abettors
accountable—for example, from the UN Security Council—if we made it clear that
we are not undermining our commitment to that goal. They also agreed that there
is an inherent contradiction in trying to delegitimize nuclear weapons among the
Muslim public and, for nonproliferation purposes, making new nuclear threats to
deter attacks.
• It is important to distinguish deterrence from compellance, which is more diffi-
cult to achieve; otherwise, we will place unrealistic expectations on deterrence.
Compellance is intended to convince a state to do something, while deterrence
usually tries to prevent a state from doing something by spelling out potential
consequences. The United States is trying to compel Iran and North Korea to
dismantle their nuclear programs. This is difficult, and its success or failure says
nothing about their undeterrability if they refuse to halt their nuclear programs.
• Deterrence should not always focus on the worst-case scenario. During the Cold
War, the United States was obsessed with preventing a bolt-from-the-blue attack.
(As one conference participant put it, “The litmus test was always, What if the
Soviets attack when everyone is snowed in in Washington, DC, and watching the
Redskins game?”) But assuming the worst case can often be counterproductive.
For example, focusing on the worst-case scenario in which Saddam Hussein
developed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) caused us to minimize the con-
siderable expenses of disarming him.
• Deterrence cannot be reduced to “the art of threatening.” Rather, it involves con-
veying reassurance at the same time as we convey a countervailing threat. Cold War
deterrence was not all about brinksmanship. The Cuban missile crisis was resolved
by a trade, not by an “eyeball to eyeball” test of wills. It was less about threat and
more about diplomacy, reassurance, and recognizing what the adversary valued.
• Deterrence is not about matching what one’s opponent possesses. It made no
sense, for example, for the United States to match the Soviet land-based inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) arsenal when it had offsetting advantages. In
modern times, this means asking whether we actually require nuclear weapons
to deter, say, Iran.
This brief summarizes the primary
findings of the conference as inter-
preted by the rapporteur, J. Peter
Scoblic. Participants neither reviewed
nor approved this brief. Therefore, it
should not be assumed that every
participant subscribes to all of its
recommendations, observations, and
conclusions.
policy dialogue brief
Critical thinking from Stanley Foundation Conferences
Strategic Deterrence
and US Nuclear
Weapons Policy
Workshop
US Nuclear Policy
Review Project
July 8, 2008
Washington, DC
