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D
eveloping military doctrine and military language has been an evolving art
since ancient times.
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New concepts, buzzwords, and acronyms, are always
being invented, but the average shelf life for a term is just short of a year. Occasion-
ally the terms last longer (particularly when they become popular in military socio-
logical and/or military political science circles). The term “revolution in military
affairs” (RMA) is one such term. It conjured up and came to imply an imminent
change in the structure of U.S. military forces, particularly in the Army. A rumor of
backstage conflict in the Pentagon between Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
and high-ranking Army officials has been occasionally mentioned in newspapers and
on television. This may have some connection with the demise of RMA in favor of
the newest phrase, “America’s New Way of War,” signifying (a more incremental?)
change in our military.
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Paul R. Camacho
Over the last several years there have been a number of calls for the develop-
ment of a new theoretical doctrine to govern the force structure of the United
States military. The last big change in doctrine occurred in the post-Vietnam
era. It involved not simply the change to the all-volunteer force, but an aban-
donment of escalation brinkmanship and open-ended missions. The subsequent
Powell Doctrine demanded the use of overwhelming force and clear objectives
and boundaries for military intervention. As the new millennium approached,
the deficiencies of the Powell Doctrine became apparent — the multilateral
approach of coalition building and the logistic assembly of forces and equip-
ment was too cumbersome to respond to the new threats from non-state entities.
This led to the development of the concept of Force Transformation as em-
braced by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Yet the modernization plans
envisioned by him are meeting significant resistance within the military because
of September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq — in short, such dramatic change is too
risky given these immediate challenges and the entrenched interests of the mili-
tary bureaucracy.
This paper outlines a number of changes in the overarching social conditions
and the various technological advances in weapons development. Next, the
paper discusses the resistance to change in the military that was demonstrated in
the first Gulf War and the problem of the overextension of the Guards and Re-
serves. Finally, the paper examines a few scenarios of reorganization and three
possible paths that the military can pursue.
Paul R. Camacho is director of special projects at the William Joiner Center at the University
of Massachusetts Boston.
