Limited War Under the Nuclear Umbrella and its Implications for
South Asia
Khurshid Khan
∗
ince the creation of India and Pakistan, both countries have been involved in several conflicts
that continue to pose the risk of inadvertent war. These conflicts include the Kashmir dispute,
territorial disputes such as Siachen, a nuclear arms race, and water disputes. Unlike in the past, any future
war between the two countries, no matter how limited it might be, will have the potential to escalate into a
full-scale nuclear war in light of the changed strategic environment. Although the nuclear tests conducted
by India and Pakistan in May 1998 have radically changed the strategic landscape in South Asia, nuclear
weapons have yet to assure strategic stability in South Asia despite tall claims by various quarters. The
question of stability in South Asia cannot be isolated from global conventional and nuclear weapons
policies. The US, Chinese, Indian, Pakistani, and to some extent Russian equation constitute a nuclear
chain affecting not only the stability of South Asia but also that of other regions. Therefore, in the absence
of a positive US role and the lack of a constructive approach, based on ground realities by both India and
Pakistan, the likelihood of maintaining strategic stability in this region seems very bleak.
Soon after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, both countries formalized their respective
nuclear doctrines based on divergent approaches. Pakistan’s nuclear policy guidelines are security driven
and are specific to the perception of threats that emanate from India. Its nuclear capability is solely for the
purpose of deterrence of aggression and defence of sovereignty. In contrast, India has adopted as national
policy a nuclear doctrine that has offensive designs and retains the scope for conventional war fighting.
Knowing well that unlike the United States and the former Soviet Union, India and Pakistan have direct
and very high stakes due to geographical contiguity, the Indian leadership has contemplated fighting and
winning a limited conventional war against Pakistan. Such a limited war strategy is part of its doctrine for
achieving desired political objectives by exploiting the strategic space beneath the nuclear threshold.
Many scholars believe that this strategy is potentially dangerous as it has the inbuilt threat of escalation.
Therefore, India’s strategy of limited conventional war will continue to cause instability and uncertainty
in South Asia.
In any future crises between India and Pakistan, factors like incorrect reading of the adversary’s
intentions, inaccurate assessment of political objectives, poor intelligence on combat strength, and
unexpected conventional attacks by either side would be major sources of conflict escalation. Given the
present level of the two armies, India’s limited war strategy is unlikely to achieve the desired objectives in
a given period in the future at any level, from “surgical or punitive strike” to a full-scale “cold start”
operation. Due to geographical constraints, Pakistan would not have the flexibility to lose space in its
strategically important areas. Therefore, its army would definitely fight with its full potential to stall the
∗
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the policy viewpoints of the
Government of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army, or the Strategic Plans Division, the organization where the author is currently
working.
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