PRISM 3, no. 3 FeatuReS | 87
U
ntil it was overhauled in 2011, the assessments process in Afghanistan’s Regional
Command South was mired in 240 metrics and indicators—some of which were uncol-
lectable while others were entirely irrelevant. It lacked focus, failed to dene the problem,
and was divorced from decisionmaking cycles. That is to say, it was representative of how operational
assessments are usually conducted. There was a general understanding that measuring the conict
environment was vital to the mission and to operational success. But what that was supposed to
look like and how it was supposed to be accomplished were never articulated. What resulted was
a frenetic approach that tried to measure the universe—attempting to analyze everything and
accomplishing little.
The years 2009 and 2010 brought a sense that the soon-to-be decade-long war in South
Asia needed a new and better dened focus. The campaign in Afghanistan had evolved to a uni-
versal, all-encompassing mission, a set of tasks for which the term mission creep is euphemistic.
These tasks included counterinsurgency with all its associated complexities, counterterrorism,
stability operations, developing rural and urban economies, improving governance, countering
corruption, improving the rule of law, promoting female empowerment, building government
institutions as well as Afghan military and police organizations, and countering the growth and
BY WILLIAM P. UPSHUR, JONATHAN W. ROGINSKI, AND DAVID J. KILCULLEN
William P. Upshur is a Senior Associate with Caerus Associates, LLC. Major Jonathan W.
Roginski, USA, is an Operations Research and Systems Analyst who served as Deputy Chief
of the Afghanistan Assessments Group of 10
th
Mountain Division during its deployment to
Regional Command South. Dr. David J. Kilcullen is Founder and Chief Executive Ofcer of
Caerus Associates, LLC.
Lessons Learned and New Approaches to
Operational Assessments
Recognizing Systems
in Afghanistan
