July 2004
Volume S04-01
OBSERVING AL QAEDA
THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEXITY THEORY:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO DEFEAT TERRORISM
By Lieutenant Colonel Michael F. Beech, United States Army
Strategy Research Paper
Project Advisor: Colonel Richard Meinhart, DCLM
This SRP was submitted 19 March 2004 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic
Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesmen
and commander have to make is to establish by test the kind of war on which
they are embarking; neither mistaking for, nor trying to turn it into, something that
is alien to its nature.
1
−Carl Von Clausewitz
On War
The defeat of al Qaeda and the global network of Islamic terrorist organizations often
appear no more certain today than it did two years ago. Since 9/11 the world has witnessed
terrorist attacks against US interests and its allies in seven different countries. Al Qaeda may
have lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, but it has gained a new front by conducting operations
against US and coalition forces in Iraq. Despite US military successes, al Qaeda retains a
demonstrated ability to recruit and conduct operations globally as Osama bin Laden and many
of his most experienced inner circle and associates are still at large.
2
Although there has yet to
1
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, (New York, N.Y.: Knopf, 1993), 100.
2
Daniel Byman and Mohammed el Barabei, “Scoring the War on Terrorism”, National Interest, no. 72 (Summer, 2003): 75
[database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 25 September 2003.
