August 14, 2004
THIRD IN A SERIES
THE THIN GREEN LINE
By Andrew F. Krepinevich
SUMMARY
Following the successful major combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Army, which had organized, trained and equipped itself principally to wage
short, decisive wars against conventionally armed adversaries, has been
confronted with a protracted deployment against irregular forces waging
insurgencies.
The ground force requirements to provide stability and security to
Afghanistan and Iraq clearly exceed those available for the mission. Moreover,
the demands for Army ground force deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq are
not likely to decline substantially any time soon.
Internal options for addressing the problem—such as violating rotation
base ratios, imposing stop loss and stop movement requirements, tapping into
the Individual Ready Reserve, and deploying marines into Iraq, have already
been exercised. But they are short term fixes at best. Moreover, near-term
relief from external sources seems problematic. A sizeable, competent Iraqi
security force will likely take years, not months, to train and equip. Neither the
United Nations nor NATO is likely to be willing—or able—to provide
significant support.
Longer-term solutions put the Army in a race against time, in which its
ability to execute them competes with the demands to reduce forward
deployments or risk “breaking” the force in the form of a catastrophic decline
in recruitment and retention. Nevertheless, a combination of reforms,
involving a modest increase in the Army’s size, if aggressively executed, could
create a force sufficient to sustain current force levels indefinitely, while
maintaining a modest strategic reserve.
It must be emphasized, however, that the Army’s efforts to adapt on the
fly to the requirement to maintain large forces overseas will not, even if they
succeed, be sufficient to overcome a flawed strategy.
1
1
The issue of the United States’ strategic shortcomings will be addressed in future
backgrounders on strategy and performance metrics.
