Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2023
Riley Bailey, George Barros, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W.
Kagan
February 17, 5:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
The Kremlin will likely subsume elements of Belarus’ defense industrial base (DIB) as part of
Moscow’s larger effort to reequip the Russian military to support a protracted war against
Ukraine. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir
Putin in Moscow on February 17 that Belarus’ aerospace industry is ready to produce Su-25 ground attack aircraft
for the Russian military with the support of Russian technology transfers.
Lukashenko also stated that the
Belarusian state-run Minsk Automobile Plant began producing components to support Russian KAMAZ (a
Russian heavy-duty truck producer) products and expressed willingness to help Russia produce electronic
components to substitute for lost Western imports.
Lukashenko additionally stated that Belarus is
implementing 100 percent of unspecified defense and security cooperation agreements that Belarus and Russia
agreed to “three months ago.”
Additional Su-25s and truck parts are likely not critical material for the success of Russia’s long-term war effort.
The Kremlin may commandeer Belarusian factories and retool them to produce critical materiel that the Russian
military needs, Lukashenko’s statements notwithstanding. The Russians might also seek to repurpose Russian
factories currently involved in or tooled for the production of Su-25s and trucks to produce more urgently needed
materiel. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces began using Belarusian training grounds and trainers to
train mobilized Russians to compensate for Russia‘s degraded training capacity.
The Kremlin appears to be
similarly incorporating elements of Belarus’ DIB to augment Russian defense output as Putin seeks to
reinvigorate Russia’s DIB to support a protracted war with Ukraine.
Lukashenko confirmed that Belarus has implemented more Union State integration programs -
marking progress in the Kremlin’s steady pressure campaign to formalize the Russian-
Belarusian Union State across decades. Lukashenko stated on February 17 that Russia and Belarus
implemented 80 percent of the 28 Union State programs including programs on customs and tax – a significant
achievement in the Kremlin’s campaign to formalize the Union State.
Lukashenko has historically resisted
implementing the Union State integration programs by stalling specifically on complex customs and tax
harmonization issues since at least 2019.
Lukashenko’s statement that Belarus has finally ratified Union State
programs on customs and tax issues therefore marks a significant Russian gain. Lukashenko stated that the
remaining unimplemented Union State programs concern humanitarian issues.
Lukashenko is likely paying for his rejection of Putin’s larger demand for Belarusian forces to join the invasion
against Ukraine by making smaller concessions that he has stonewalled for years, as ISW assessed.
Lukashenko’s belated concessions and continued refusal to commit Belarusian forces to the Russian invasion
indicates Lukashenko’s determination to keep Belarusian forces from directly participating in the Russian war.
The Kremlin’s gains in Belarus underscore that Putin’s imperialistic ambitions transcend
Ukraine and that containing the Russian threat requires the West’s sustained attention. Putin will
very likely make significant gains in restoring Russian suzerainty over Belarus regardless of the outcome of his
invasion of Ukraine. ISW has long assessed that the West sometimes ignores Putin’s activities that appear trivial,
but that seemingly trivial activities that fly under the radar are essential to Putin’s strategic gains in the long
