Institute for the Study of War and
the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 20, 2023
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson,
and Frederick W. Kagan
February 20, 8:45 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
US President Joe Biden visited Kyiv on February 20 ahead of the first anniversary of
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Biden met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
and announced that the US will provide an additional $500 million in military assistance to Ukraine,
including howitzer shells, anti-tank missiles, air surveillance radars, and other aid.
US National
Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the Biden administration notified Moscow of Biden’s visit
shortly before his departure for Ukraine for "deconfliction purposes."
Biden’s visit and the timing of
his trip to Europe clearly signal continued Western support for Ukraine following concerted Russian
efforts to deter Western military aid and political support.
Ukrainian officials continue to respond to statements made by unspecified US defense
officials on the pace and prospects of the war as it approaches the one-year mark.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 20 that Ukraine will continue to defend
Bakhmut but "not at any cost."
Zelensky and Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov also
emphasized that Ukrainian troops are continuing to prepare for counteroffensives in the near term.
Zelensky and Reznikov’s statements are likely direct responses to unspecified US defense officials, who
reportedly told the Washington Post on February 14 that the United States is concerned about Ukraine’s
ability to defend Bakhmut while also pursuing counteroffensive operations.
ISW continues to assess
that Ukraine’s decision to defend Bakhmut is a strategically sound effort to pin Russian forces in a
discrete area of the front and attrit them, Zelensky likely tempered his administration’s stance on
Bakhmut to make a limited rhetorical concession to US officials.
It has long been clear that Ukraine
would not continue to defend Bakhmut at the risk of seeing large numbers of Ukrainian troops encircled
in the city, so Zelensky’s comment is not likely a real change in Kyiv’s strategy.
Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, Defense, and Intelligence member Fedir
Venislavskyi notably stated on February 19 that Russia has "all combat-ready units on the line of contact
In Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and partly in Zaporizhia Oblast," reaffirming the assessment that
Russia does not have a large uncommitted combat ready reserves that can be deployed and change the
course of operations.
These Ukrainian statements are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Ukraine
has the capacity to regain the initiative in 2023 with sufficient and timely Western backing.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed the formal integration of the Donetsk
and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR/LNR) militias into the Russian Armed Forces on
February 19 in response to growing criticism about reported command changes within
the proxy units. The Russian MoD denied reports about the alleged dismissal of officers of the
integrated DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd Army Corps, likely in response to widespread milblogger and
proxy criticisms about the reported dismissal of DNR Militia Spokesman Eduard Basurin on February
17.
Basurin discussed his dismissal in a publicized meeting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny
Prigozhin on February 19 in which he stated that such command changes will "harm" proxy
commanders and servicemen.
Basurin noted that servicemen in occupied Donetsk Oblast trust their
