1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 18, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, George Barros, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick Kagan
February 18, 7 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted another missile strike attack targeting Ukrainian infrastructure throughout the
country. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 18 that Russian forces launched 16 missiles targeting civilian
infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi City and Ukraiinsk in Donetsk Oblast (about 30km west of Donetsk City).[1] Ukrainian
military officials reported that Ukrainian air defense systems shot down two Kalibr missiles of four launched earlier in the
day but did not release the total number of intercepted missiles towards the end of the day.[2] Ukrainian officials also did
not release information about the type of missiles Russian forces used during this attack as of the time of this publication.
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure facilities in Khmelnytskyi City and oblast and
Kryvyi Rih.[3] Ukrainian nuclear enterprise Energoatom reported that two Russian missiles flew dangerously close to the
South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).[4]
Russian news aggregators are advocating for Russia to carry out “retaliatory strikes” that would
systematically target electrical infrastructure supporting Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs) to force
Ukraine to conduct emergency shutdowns of its NPPs. Prominent Russian news aggregator Readovka told its
audience of almost 1.7 million subscribers that Russian forces need to prioritize the “decommissioning” of the NPPs’ external
electrical infrastructure in hopes that doing so would lead to the emergency shutdown of NPPs in Ukraine.[5] Readovka did
not advocate for Russian forces to directly strike nuclear power plants or attempt to cause radiological events, but rather to
target separate substations that would cut off electrical supply essential to the safe operation of the plants thereby forcing
Ukrainian officials to shut the plants down in ways that would make it very difficult to restart them. Readovka stated that
the destruction of such targets for the three Ukrainian NPPs outside of Russian-occupied areas “will cause damage many
times greater than the last few massive missile strikes.”[6] Readovka claimed with low confidence that the February 18
missile strike on Khmelnytskyi City may have targeted one such substation that supports the Khmelnytskyi NPP, though
Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces hit a military facility and civilian infrastructure.[7] Readovka had previously
advocated for such strikes noting that Russia’s massive missile strikes have not generated the desired effect of prompting
the Ukrainian government‘s capitulation.[8] ISW has no other evidence that Russia is pursuing or considering such a course
of action but observes that the Russian militarization of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, the use of Zaporizhzhia NPP grounds to fire
at Ukrainian positions, and the reported Russian strikes on Zaporizhzhia NPP transmission lines all suggest that it is not
beyond the realm of the conceivable that the Kremlin might pursue actions with the intent of forcing the emergency
shutdowns of Ukrainian nuclear reactors.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) reported dismissal of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) military
spokesman Eduard Basurin as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR militia under the Russian MoD
triggered another wave of Russian milblogger criticisms against the Russian defense establishment. A
prominent Russian milblogger broke the news to his over one million subscribers that Russian military officials fired Press
Secretary of the DNR’s Military Command Eduard Basurin on February 17.[9] This milblogger reported that the Russian
defense establishment seeks to replace all commanders of the DNR and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militias with
professional Russian officers as part of the formal reorganization of the DNR and LNR militias under the Russian MoD.
Many Russian milbloggers met the news with discontent, disappointment, and outrage, stating that the DNR and LNR
commanders have practical experience fighting Ukraine and are better than the “real” Russian commanders even if DNR
and LNR commanders do not have formal military education, know the military‘s peacetime functions, have the right
bureaucratic experiences, or meet the Russian military’s physical fitness requirements.[10] Some milbloggers stated that a
purge of the DNR and LNR officers would degrade Russian fighters’ morale and undercut support for the Russian military
establishment.[11] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that he will meet with DNR commanders in the near
future to discuss Basurin’s alleged dismissal and stated that the news must be some kind of fake propaganda because firing
DNR and LNR commanders would be unacceptable.[12] Prigozhin will likely exploit this episode in his ongoing
informational counteroffensive against the Russian MoD if Basurin’s dismissal is confirmed.[13]
The DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd army corps are not and never have been a professional military or even an effective fighting
force. These Russian proxies were ineffective at capturing and holding ground during the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014
and required reinforcements from the conventional Russian military to capture Debaltseve in 2015.[14] DNR and LNR unit
effectiveness has not improve since 2014, and the proxy forces and have continued to be ineffective in the renewed invasion
