1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick Kagan
February 16, 6:45pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian forces conducted another missile strike on infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine on
February 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces fired 32 air- and sea-launched missiles at Ukraine,
including 12 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft over the Caspian Sea, 8 Kalibr cruise missiles from a
Black Sea frigate, 12 Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 long-range bombers over Kursk Oblast, and 2 Kh-59 cruise
missiles from Su-35 aircraft over Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Ukrainian air defense reportedly shot down 14 Kh-
101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and 2 Kh-59 cruise missiles, 6 over Mykolaiv Oblast, 2 over Kherson Oblast, and the remainder
over western regions of Ukraine.[2] Russian missiles struck infrastructure targets in Lviv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and
Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces have
changed their tactics and are launching cruise missiles at night, instead of in the middle of day, in order to take Ukrainian
air defense forces by surprise.[4]
Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria
Lvova-Belova on February 16, confirming that the Kremlin is directly involved in facilitating the
deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families. During an in-person working meeting
with Lvova-Belova, Putin stated that the number of applications submitted by Russian citizens for the adoption of children
from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts is growing significantly.[5] Lvova-Belova noted that she herself
adopted a child from Mariupol and stated that she has particularly been working with Russian families to facilitate the
placement of Ukrainian children into Russian homes, highlighting the story of one Moscow Oblast family who took custody
of nine children.[6] Lvova-Belova confirmed that Russian regional governors are facilitating adoption efforts
and emphasized the role of Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s efforts to work with her on programs for
“difficult teenagers.”[7] Lvova-Belova’s and Putin’s meeting is likely a result of Putin’s January 3 list of instructions to
Lvova-Belova and the occupation heads of occupied oblasts directing them to take a number of measures ostensibly to
support children in occupied areas of Ukraine.[8] This meeting is additionally noteworthy because it suggests that Putin
himself is overseeing and directing efforts to facilitate deportation and adoption programs, which ISW continues to assess
may constitute a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[9]
Putin also ostensibly made a limited concession to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin during his
meeting with Lvova-Belova. Lvova-Belova noted that some servicemembers are fighting for Russia in private military
companies (PMCs) but that their families aren’t receiving the same social support as families of other
servicemembers.[10] Putin responded that volunteers, contract servicemen, and everyone in the Russian Armed Forces are
equal and that Russian officials are working on providing social benefits to all families, including those of PMC fighters.
While Putin did not mention the Wagner Group explicitly, the allusion to PMCs suggests that Putin to some degree sees
such irregular military formations as equal to conventional Russian forces. The provision of social guarantees to families of
PMCs, especially Wagner, would mark an inflection from Putin’s recent attempts to disenfranchise Wagner and move closer
to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) establishment, on which ISW has previously reported.[11]
Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces aim to capture Bakhmut by the first anniversary of the
invasion of Ukraine, which would require a significantly higher rate of Russian advance than anything
seen for many months. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on February
16 that Russian forces intend to capture Bakhmut by February 24 to mark the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine
and plan to conduct a massive series of missile strikes to mark the date.[12] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin
recently stated that he expects Wagner Group fighters to encircle Bakhmut by March or April, and Prigozhin‘s pragmatic
assessments of Russian advances in the Bakhmut area have generally been closer to tactical realities than assessments
forecasting rapid Russian advances.[13] Russian forces do not appear to be quickening their rate of advance around
Bakhmut and are unlikely to meet this reported February 24 goal. Ukrainian forces could always decide that the costs
associated with holding Bakhmut are too high and voluntarily withdraw from the city, although Ukrainian forces and leaders
continue to indicate that they intend to hold the city. ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut would
likely prevent Putin from claiming that Russian forces secured the city on the anniversary of the invasion in an attempt to
renew hope in a Russian victory in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin may launch another series of missile strikes on civilian targets
throughout Ukraine to mark the symbolic anniversary as actual military success continues to evade the Russian military.
