Institute for the Study of War and
the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2023
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson,
and Frederick Kagan
February 13, 10:30 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Moscow continues to leverage its relationship with Iran to provide military support for
the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) intercepted audio
on February 10 reportedly of two Shahed drone operators coordinating targets in what the GUR claimed
was a "Kurdish dialect interspersed with Farsi words."
ISW cannot identify the dialect in the audio
intercept with high confidence, but the fact that the individuals in the audio clip are Shahed operators
indicates that they may be operators from Iranian Kurdistan who are likely affiliated with the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is far less likely that Russia has been able to identify or import
individual Kurdish militants with experience operating drones to conduct Shahed strikes on Ukraine.
ISW has previously reported that IRGC-affiliated elements are likely supporting Russia’s use Shahed
drones by acting as operators and trainers, and the operators in the GUR intercept are likely part of the
same line of effort.
UK outlet The Guardian relatedly reported on February 13 that Iran has smuggled
at least 18 long-range drones to Russia using boats and Iranian state-owned aircraft.
The Guardian
found that these shipments include six Mohajer-6 drones and 12 Shahed-121 and 129 drones, which
have air-to-ground strike capabilities and are designed to deliver a payload to the target and return to
base, unlike the Shahed-131 and 136 loitering munition-type drones that Russian forces have widely
used in Ukraine thus far.
Russian milbloggers noted on February 13 that IRGC-affiliated Il-76 cargo
aircraft routinely fly to Russia, suggesting that Tehran consistently provides Moscow with a variety of
material using IRGC-affiliated planes.
These data points, taken in tandem, suggest that Russia
continues to rely on Iran for military and technological support in Ukraine and that some Iranian
personnel are likely in Ukraine directly supporting Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure,
as ISW has previously reported.
The Wagner Group’s continued dissemination of deliberately brutal extrajudicial
execution videos and generally graphic content is normalizing an increasing level of
brutality and thuggishness within the domestic Russian information space. A Wagner
Group-affiliated Telegram channel posted a video on February 12 showing the brutal execution of
former Wagner fighter Dmitry Yakushchenko with a sledgehammer.
Yakushchenko reportedly was
convicted of robbery and murder in Crimea and was serving a 19-year sentence when he joined
Wagner.
The Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel accused Yakushchenko of defecting to Ukraine and
posted a video reportedly of Yakushchenko expressing pro-Ukrainian sentiments while in Ukrainian
captivity.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin later posted a video that appears to be of
Yakushchenko alive and uninjured and thanking Wagner for forgiveness.
Whether the videos of
Yakushchenko’s execution or alleged proof-of-life are real—or in what sequence they might have been
recorded—are less important than the wider issue highlighted by the creation and dissemination of such
videos. Several prominent milbloggers responded positively to the execution video, claiming that such
vicious and inhumane killing is an appropriate way for Wagner to deal with betrayal in its ranks.
The
Wagner-affiliated channel that originally circulated the video claimed that being accused of brutality
during a war is like getting fined for speeding during a car race, which is the same remark made by the
channel following the summary execution of ex-Wagner fighter Yevgeny Nuzhin in November 2022.
