Institute for the Study of War and
the Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2023
Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and Frederick W. Kagan
February 11, 9 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s
ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances
of the Russian Armed Forces. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate
(GUR), Andriy Chernyak, stated that Russia does not have the resources necessary to launch a large-scale
offensive operation on February 24 to coincide with the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Chernyak noted
that Russians are preparing to intensify their attacks in eastern Ukraine in the next few weeks and are currently
searching for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have regained
the initiative on the Svatove-Kreminna line but that the offensive has not yet reached its full tempo.
Ukrainian
Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, also noted that the Russian leadership had
ordered the capture of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts’ administrative borders and said that the grinding Russian
operations in Bakhmut are a “symbol” of Russia’s inability to conduct rapid and powerful offensive operations.”
Russian milbloggers continue to appear demoralized at the Kremlin’s prospects for executing a major offensive.
Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander Alexander Khodakovsky questioned why Russian forces are
wasting their limited resources on small-scale grinding advances rather than accumulating combat force to
launch larger-scale offensives.
Another milblogger amplified Khodakovsky’s concern, accusing Russian
presidential administration officials of creating unattainable expectations for Russian offensives.
Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast,
have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces
are able to launch a decisive offensive operation. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that
Russian forces failed to quickly advance in the first days of their offensive to capture Vuhledar and that Russian
forces had lost the initiative by the end of January due to Ukrainian forces’ rapid transfer of reserves to the area.
The milblogger made his assessment that the Russian offensive to capture Vuhledar has likely culminated in
response to viral footage showing Ukrainian forces destroying a disorderly column of Russian mechanized forces
in the Vuhledar area.
Russian milbloggers seized on the footage to criticize the Russian military command for
repeating the same failures that have plagued the Russian military throughout the war in Ukraine, with one
prominent milblogger arguing that such incidents illustrate that the Russian army is unable to conduct an
offensive along the entire Donetsk front.
The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the
lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian
observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional
mechanized maneuver warfare. The Russian military command is deploying its most elite units to the
Bakhmut area in smaller formations using urban infiltration tactics, according to the limited footage of Russian
tactics in the area that ISW has observed.
These tactics seem to be resulting in significant tactical Russian
advances in the Bakhmut area that could lead to operational gains if Ukrainian forces choose to withdraw from
Bakhmut. Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast and along the Svatove-Kreminna line have
resulted in marginal advances without operational significance thus far. ISW has observed limited footage of
Russian tactics in areas separate from the Bakhmut effort that suggests that Russian forces are engaging in more
traditional mechanized maneuver warfare tactics with regular, not elite, motorized rifle, naval infantry, and tank
elements.
All the formations so far observed were rendered combat-ineffective in earlier phases of the war and
