1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2022
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W.
Kagan
February 7, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu held a press conference on the status of the war on February 7,
likely in an attempt to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved
leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine. Shoigu
claimed that Russian forces are successfully developing operations near Bakhmut and Vuhledar and claimed that Russian
troops have recently taken control of Soledar, Klishchiivka, Pidhorodne, Krasnopolivka, Blahodatne, and Mykolaivka in
the Bakhmut area and Lobkove in Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Shoigu likely held this press conference in order to create the
guise of formality and legitimacy for the Russian MoD as it continues efforts to reform the Russian military, prepare for a
renewed offensive, and set conditions for prolonged operations in Ukraine. ISW has previously noted that Russian officials
are preparing for an imminent Russian offensive in Ukraine in the coming months, and that these preparations are also
happening on the strategic level with Russian command structures.[2]
Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer
Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power. The UK MoD
assessed on February 7 that Russia has highly likely been attempting to launch a major offensive operation to reach the
Donetsk Oblast administrative borders since early January 2023 but had only been able to gain several hundred meters of
territory per week.[3] The UK MoD attributed such a slow pace to Russian munitions shortages and a lack of maneuver
units that are necessary for a successful and rapid offensive. The UK MoD noted that Russia is unlikely to build up the
combat power necessary to substantially affect the outcome of the war while Russian military command continues to
demand for unrealistic and sweeping advances. ISW similarly assessed on January 28 that Russian leadership may be
once again planning a decisive offensive based on erroneous assumptions about Russian military capabilities and likely
lacks the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation.[4] ISW also observed the Kremlin
signaling preparations for an early 2023 offensive in December but assessed that the time and space relationship may
hinder Russian rapid and large-scale advance aspirations as Ukraine heads into a muddy spring season unsuitable for
maneuver warfare.[5]
The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to
sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline. One prominent milblogger
warned that Russian forces should not fall into the trap of attempting to start numerous offensive operations like they did
in spring 2022 but instead focus on gradual advances that would generate high casualties among Ukrainian forces. The
milblogger added that Russian military command should prioritize tiring Ukrainian forces and disrupting their logistics
rather than conducting a frontal assault. Another milblogger stated that Russia still needs to create a breakthrough force
and reject its current tactic of launching small, localized offensives that waste Russian combat on “capturing
fields.”[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian efforts to conduct spoiling attacks and to fix Ukrainian forces further
undermine the sustainability of a major offensive.
Russian state energy company Gazprom may be creating its own private security force, likely in an effort
to normalize state-affiliated paramilitary groups and undermine private military companies (PMCs). The
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on February 7 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail
Mishustin privately authorized Gazprom subsidiary Gazprom Nafta to establish a 70 percent stake in its own private
security company under a law on the safety of fuel and energy complex assets.[7] While it is not inherently unusual for
state and private energy companies to establish private security forces to protect their assets, the GUR noted that the
creation of this PMC aligns with ongoing tensions between the Kremlin and Wagner Group PMC financier Yevgeny
Prigozhin. Russia may use these Gazprom security forces for purposes other than protecting Russian energy assets.
The Kremlin may be considering implementing some demands previously voiced by Wagner Group
financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to build rapport with other nationalist figures who advocated for similar
policies. Head of the Russian State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Vasily Piskarev is reportedly
preparing amendments to the Russian Criminal Code to include provisions against discreditation of individuals who
participated in combat operations and volunteer detachments that assist the Russian Armed Forces during the war in
Ukraine.[8] Russian state media credited Prigozhin as the initiator of the amendment, and the provision will likely include
Wagner mercenaries whom the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) repeatedly labeled as “volunteers.”[9] The largest
Russia media holding company, Gazprom Media, is reportedly planning to ban its media outlets (which include Russian
