1 Instute for the Study of War and AEI’s Crical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 7, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W.
Kagan
May 7, 2023, 6:25pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov may
have compelled the Russian theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Valery
Gerasimov, to resume artillery ammunition distribution to the Wagner forces in
Bakhmut despite Gerasimov’s desired de-prioritization of that effort. Prigozhin
announced on May 7 that he had obtained a document from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)
that promised to supply Wagner forces with the ammunition and weapons necessary to maintain
offensive operations in Bakhmut.[1] Prigozhin has not published the official document and ISW
cannot verify Prigozhin’s claims at this time. The Russian MoD likely has not fundamentally changed
its intention of deprioritizing offensive operations and conserving munitions across the theater, as
ISW has recently assessed. Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely effectively blackmailed the Russian MoD into
allocating resources to Wagner forces in Bakhmut by threatening to pull Kadyrov’s Chechen forces
from other parts of the theater to relieve Wagner forces in Bakhmut.[2] Prigozhin also claimed that
the MoD gave Wagner complete freedom of operations in Bakhmut and appointed Army General
Sergey Surovikin as an intermediary between the MoD and Wagner, actions that would indicate that
Gerasimov and possibly Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu lack the ability to command Prigozhin and
Kadyrov as subordinates but must instead negotiate with them as peers.[3]
This assessment assumes that Prigozhin’s claims that the MoD was withholding shells
but has now agreed to supply them are true—the MoD has made no official statements
regarding those claims—and Ukrainian officials report that they have not observed a
decline in Wagner shelling during this period (see below).[4]
Kadyrov’s threats to transfer his forces to Bakhmut may have blackmailed the Russian
military command into allocating ammunition to Wagner mercenaries. Kadyrov
published a letter on May 6 asking Russian President Vladimir Putin to order Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu and Director of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvadia) Viktor Zolotov to
authorize the transfer of Chechen “Akhmat” units from “other directions” to assume Wagner’s
positions in the Bakhmut direction.[5] Kadyrov’s letter to Putin bypassed the Russian chain of
command, and the withdrawal of Chechen forces from other parts of the theater likely posed a risk to
Russian defensive lines, a risk that Gerasimov and Shoigu, or Putin, appear to have been unwilling to
take. ISW previously observed Akhmat units operating in the Bilohorivka area on the Svatove-
