1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 5, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson,
and Frederick W. Kagan
May 5, 2023, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to have deprioritized the Bakhmut
offensive in favor of preparing to defend against an anticipated Ukrainian
counteroffensive, putting the Wagner Group and Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in
a potentially difficult position. Prigozhin released a series of videos on May 4 and 5 announcing
that Wagner will withdraw from Bakhmut on May 10 unless Wagner receives necessary supplies and
launched particularly acerbic and emotional attacks against Chief of the Russian General Staff Army
General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, and the Russian MoD
establishment writ large.
Prigozhin’s palpable desperation in the videos, one of which shows the
corpses of recently deceased Wagner fighters, marks a significant rhetorical inflection in his continued
pleas for increased Russian MoD support for Wagner in Bakhmut. His visible and visceral anger
suggests that the Russian MoD has likely deprioritized Bakhmut and shifted operational focus
elsewhere in the theater in ways that may seriously compromise Wagner’s ability to operate effectively.
Wagner has not ceased efforts to completely capture Bakhmut despite reduced access to ammunition
and other necessary supplies, however. Prigozhin has shown no willingness to switch to the defensive
within the city.
Wagner’s continued persistence within Bakhmut is incongruent with the overall slow-
down in the pace of Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Ukraine as conventional
Russian forces appear to be largely shifting focus to prepare to receive the much-
anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Aside from very limited and localized attacks in the
Kreminna area and near Donetsk City, Russian forces have largely ceased offensive operations
throughout the theater, likely signifying a transition to the defensive.
It would be an operationally
sound decision for the Russian MoD to begin withholding and stockpiling ammunition and supplies in
order to prepare for any Ukrainian counteroffensive actions, and Prigozhin’s desperate statements
indicate that the Russian MoD is likely doing so. ISW has recently reported that Prigozhin began
appealing to the Russian MoD to provide Wagner with necessary ammunition once again after a brief
period during which it seemed that relations between Prigozhin and Russian military leadership had
improved.
Prigozhin’s renewed anger reached its peak in the May 4 video of Prigozhin essentially
screaming at Gerasimov and Shoigu and accusing them of the deaths of Wagner fighters.
