俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年5月6日

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时间:2023-06-20

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1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, and Mason Clark
May 6, 2023, 4:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan
Kadyrov stated their intent on May 6 for Chechen “Akhmat” troops to replace Wagner
Group forces in Bakhmut on May 10. Prigozhin published a letter to Russian Minister of Defense
Sergei Shoigu on May 6 declaring that Wagner will hand over its positions to Akhmat units at exactly
midnight on May 10, when Prigozhin claims Wagner will have entirely run out of combat potential.
1
Prigozhin expressed his confidence that Akhmat forces can capture the remaining 2.5 square kilometers
of Bakhmut that remain under Ukrainian control.
2
Kadyrov responded to Prigozhin by stating he has
addressed a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin signaling his readiness to take Bakhmut and
claimed that Chechen units are already working on a strategy with the Russian MoD for the Chechens
to take over Wagner‘s positions.
3
Prigozhin and Kadyrov likely aim to frame the Russian MoD and regular Russian troops
as ineffective and set conditions to blame the MoD for any Russian setbacks in the
Bakhmut area. Prigozhin’s decision to hand responsibility for Bakhmut over to the forces of a fellow
silovik deliberately excludes the conventional Russian airborne (VDV) troops already operating on
Wagner’s northern and southern flanks around Bakhmut, framing the battle of Bakhmut strictly as a
Wagner and now Akhmat concern. This decision reflects Prigozhin’s ongoing distrust of the Russian
military command, and postures himself as independent from the Russian military establishment and
allows him to save face if Wagner forces cannot capture Bakhmut and avoiding a repeat of the capture
of Soledar where the Russian MoD took credit for what Prigozhin claimed was a Wagner success.
4
Kadyrov, in turn, could benefit from the positive reputational effect of entering such a high-profile
operation with the backing of Prigozhin’s personal notoriety. Kadyrov recently met with several high-
ranking Russian officials in Russia, likely to ameliorate his own reputation within Russian political
circles.
5
The switch from Wagner to Akhmat troops may also set conditions to blame the Russian MoD
for future failures down the line if Akhmat forces experience similar difficulties to Wagner and are
unable to completely capture Bakhmut, Prigozhin and Kadyrov may feasibly blame the MoD for failing
to adequately support their efforts. Alternatively, if the Russian MoD prevents Akhmat forces from
relieving Wagner (as it is unclear if Prigozhin and Kadyrov can execute this maneuver without any
Russian MoD support as they claim), the two siloviki and their allies will likely brandish the
hypothetical that if only the Russian MoD had supported the maneuver, Chechen forces would have
captured Bakhmut quickly.
While the potential deployment of Akhmat troops to Bakhmut could increase Russian
combat power to some degree, the claims made by Prigozhin and Kadyrov are greatly
exaggerated. Akhmat forces have deployed throughout Ukraine, mostly in the Bilohorivka area in
Luhansk Oblast and in scattered areas in the south, over the course of 2023 but have not been majorly
committed to decisive offensive operations.
6
The Chechen forces that would deploy to Bakhmut are
therefore likely substantially fresher and less degraded than Wagner forces which have remained on
the front for months. However, Kadyrov’s suggestion that Akhmat will be able to rapidly advance in and
occupy Bakhmut in “a matter of hours” is typical Kadyrov braggadocio and ignores the tactical situation
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