1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2023
Riley Bailey and Kateryna Stepanenko
April 30, 10 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW
produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map
archive monthly.
ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 30. This report
details changes in the Russian military command since Russia began its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine
without a clear and doctrinal command structure and his reluctance to appoint an
overall theater commander have had lasting effects on the structure of the Russian
command in Ukraine. Putin’s regular command changes have led to an increasingly
factionalized Russian military and disorganized command structures that are degrading
the Russian military’s ability to conduct a cohesive campaign in Ukraine. Factions are
not a phenomenon particular to the Russian military, although their current dynamics
within the Russian military are shaping decision making to an unusual degree. The
Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Kremlin have been deliberately vague about
most of these command changes. ISW’s timeline of the changes is based on official
Russian statements as well as analysis of unconfirmed claims and reports from Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western sources. The exact dates of command changes are based on the
first reporting of a change and may not correspond with the formal date on which a
change occurred. These command changes were likely not discrete events resulting from
decisions made suddenly but were instead drawn-out bureaucratic affairs.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reluctance to appoint an overall theater commander
for his invasion of Ukraine has had cascading effects on the Russian military including
fueling intense factionalization, disorganizing command structures, and feeding
unattainable expectations. Western officials reported in April 2022 that Russia had not have a
single military commander of its forces in Ukraine since the start of the invasion on February 24, 2022.
Putin may have been reluctant to appoint a commander for this invasion to avoid
crediting a military commander with the military victory in Ukraine – a dynamic similar to the one
between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov during World War
II. Stalin had limited and outdated wartime experience and was reportedly jealous of Zhukov’s military
exploits and fame. Putin has no military experience, which may have further contributed to his decision
not to appoint a commander for his invasion who could have upstaged him by claiming credit for the
expected dramatic victory.
