Instute for the Study of War and AEI’s Crical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2, 2023
Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Mason Clark
May 2, 2023, 7:00 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed that the Russian defense industrial
base (DIB) is increasing its production of precision missiles for use against Ukraine.
Shoigu highlighted the state-owned Tactical Missiles Corporation as a model defense enterprise,
stating that is successfully beginning mass production of missiles and will develop plans to double its
current production output in the near term.[1] Shoigu’s focus on precision missile production aligns
with a shift in Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s rhetoric focusing on Russia‘s use of precision
missiles to strike military infrastructure targets in Ukrainian rear areas, likely aiming to similarly
appear proactive and demonstrative positive Russian actions amid growing concerns in the Russian
information space about a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[2]
Shoigu likely seeks to deflect intensifying accusations that the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MoD) cannot provide sufficient ammunition to Russian forces. Shoigu stated
that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) increased its production pace and output volumes, and
claimed that Russian forces have received enough ammunition to date in 2023 to inflict extensive
damage on Ukrainian forces.[3] ISW previously reported that the Russian military command is
reshuffling the leadership of command organs associated with logistics and force generation efforts
after commanders that oppose Gerasimov and the core of the Russian MoD partially regained Russian
President Vladimir Putin’s favor in late March.[4] Russian milbloggers also began naming specific
Russian MoD officials in their accusations of poor supply provisions to Russian forces in this
period.[5] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to claim that the Russian MoD is
deliberately setting Wagner mercenaries up for failure in Bakhmut by refusing to provide their
requested number of shells, which his commanders claim is leading to high casualties and slow
progress on the battlefield.[6] A Wagner serviceman also claimed that he delivered 39 boxes with
complaints from Wagner servicemen about lack of ammunition to the Russian State Duma’s Defense
Committee on May 2.[7]
Russian reactions to a claimed strike against a vehicle carrying Ukrainian Territorial
Defense Forces Commander Major General Ihor Tantsyura suggest Russian
ultranationalists seek to frame any Russian operations as delaying potential Ukrainian
counteroffensive actions. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on May 2 that
Wagner forces struck a Ukrainian armored vehicle carrying Tantsyura enroute to Bakhmut, and
published a video purporting to show the strike.[8] Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces
Spokesperson Denys Zelinskyi denied Prigozhin’s claim and stated that “everyone is alive and
well.”[9] Prigozhin responded that Wagner will continue to operate in the area.[10] Milbloggers
widely circulated Prigozhin’s claims and framed the strike as an informational victory.[11] A
prominent milblogger claimed that Tantsyura received an order to transfer reserves to Bakhmut and
prepare Ukrainian forces to conduct counterattacks in the area, likely to frame the Russian strike as
