1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 26, 5pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
Russia appears to be continuing a deliberate depopulation campaign in occupied areas
of Ukraine in order to facilitate the repopulation of Ukrainian territories with Russians.
Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on April 26 that Russia is trying to change
the ethnic composition of Ukraine by actively conducting a large-scale resettlement of people mainly
from poorer and remote regions of Russia into Ukraine.
Malyar noted that the most intensive efforts
are ongoing in occupied Luhansk Oblast and remarked that Russia is also deporting Ukrainians and
forcibly resettling them in Russia.
ISW previously reported on specific instances of Russian authorities
overseeing the depopulation and repopulation of areas of occupied Ukraine, particularly in occupied
Kherson Oblast over the course of 2022. Ukrainian sources remarked in October 2022 that Russian
authorities in then-occupied parts of Kherson Oblast deported large groups of Ukrainian residents to
Russia under the guise of humanitarian evacuations and then repopulated their homes with Russian
soldiers.
Russia may hope to import Russians to fill depopulated areas of Ukraine in order to further
integrate occupied areas into Russian socially, administratively, politically, and economically, thereby
complicating conditions for the reintegration of these territories into Ukraine. ISW has previously
assessed that such depopulation and repopulation campaigns may amount to a deliberate ethnic
cleansing effort and apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide.
Competition among Russian private military companies (PMCs) is likely increasing in
Bakhmut. A video appeal addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin by personnel of the “Potok”
PMC (reportedly one of three volunteer detachments from Russian-state owned energy company
Gazprom) claims that Gazprom officials told members of “Potok” that they would be signing contracts
with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) but then forced personnel to sign contracts with PMC
“Redut.”
One Potok soldier claimed that Gazprom created two other units — “Fakel” and “Plamya,”
which were attached to the Russian MoD.
A Russian milblogger claimed that ”Potok“ is not a PMC, but
a BARS (Combat Reserve) unit, however.
The ”Potok” personnel also reported poor treatment by
Wagner fighters who threatened to shoot ”Potok” personnel if they withdrew from the line of contact.
A Wagner fighter claimed in an interview published on April 26 that ”Potok” fighters abandoned
Wagner’s flanks at night.
A Russian milblogger claimed that “Potok” fighters abandoned their
positions in Bakhmut due to a lack of ammunition.
ISW previously assessed that Wagner financier
Yevgeny Prigozhin likely views the proliferation of PMCs around Bakhmut as competition, and it
appears that the increased prevalence of other PMCs around Bakhmut may be causing substantial
friction.
The Kremlin continues measures to codify conditions for domestic repression. The
