1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2023
Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Layne Philipson, Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros,
and Frederick W. Kagan
April 24, 7pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily
alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These
maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic
frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military
command changes on April 20. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Putin signed a decree on April 20 about
a series of military command changes and formally dismissed Commander of the Eastern Military District Colonel General
Rustam Muradov.[1] The milblogger noted that Muradov’s dismissal likely resulted from his disastrous offensive on
Vuhledar that resulted in many casualties among Russian personnel and the loss of much military equipment. The
milblogger added that the decree also forced Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov — who reportedly commanded Russian
forces in Ukraine in April 2022 — to retire. The milblogger claimed that Putin forced former commander of the Western
Military District Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlyov into retirement alongside other unnamed commanders as well. The
milblogger claimed that the Kremlin is now relying on newly reappointed Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces
Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to achieve decisive results.
These reports about command changes and dismissals follow the Kremlin’s reported dismissal of Russian Pacific Fleet
Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants on April 19.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Avakyants was not fired as a result
of poor performance during military drills in the Pacific, but that he will be forming a new “organization” under the rumored
control of the “gas sector.”[3] It is unclear if this was an intentionally vague reference to the reports about Russian state-
owned gas company Gazprom‘s formation of a private security company. The milblogger noted that he is not sure if the
organization will cooperate with the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia
(DOSAAF) or the Young Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya). ISW previously reported that Russian state gas
companies — namely Gazprom — are forming new military formations and that DOSAAF has been proactive in Russian
military recruitment efforts.[4]
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the
credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs). Prigozhin claimed to visit the positions of
“Potok” and the “Alexander Nevsky” units - which Prigozhin characterized as “micro-PMCs” - and harshly criticized the poor
condition of these units on April 24.[5] The Potok battalion is reportedly one of three volunteer detachments of the Russian
state-owned energy company Gazprom and is analogous to the Russian State Combat Reserve (BARS).[6]The Potok
battalion is reportedly subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense PMC Redut.[7] Prigozhin claimed that these units
are supposed to cover Wagner‘s flanks and asked how these units can conduct combat operations if they lack the proper
supplies and weapons. Prigozhin also criticized the general proliferation of such PMCs, which likely suggests that Prigozhin
views these new entities as Wagner’s competition.
Wagner-affiliated sources claimed on April 24 that Wagner forces tasked Potok with defending unspecified newly captured
positions to allow Wagner to regroup, but that Potok abandoned these positions and allowed Ukrainian forces to recapture
the area.[8] Alleged personnel of the Potok unit posted a video message on April 24, blaming the leadership of Gazprom and
PMC Redut for failing to provide Potok with proper weapons and supplies as well as blaming Wagner for forbidding the
Potok personnel from leaving their positions.[9] Some milbloggers — including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers — criticized
the Potok unit for blaming leadership and instead attributed their poor combat performance to their status as
volunteers.[10] The milbloggers’ and Prigozhin’s reports indicate that Wagner has authority over Russian MoD-owned
entities, which in turn indicates that Prigozhin has regained some favor with the Kremlin.
Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers likely in an
attempt to incentivize military service. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with United Russia Secretary Andrey
Turchak on April 24 to discuss initiatives to provide benefits to Russian military personnel. Putin expressed support for
Turchak’s proposal to equalize the salary of “all participants” of the war in Ukraine.[11] Turchak claimed that mobilized
personnel currently receive 195,000 rubles (about $2,400) monthly no matter where they serve, whereas contract soldiers
receive the same amount only when serving on the frontlines. Turchak claimed that contract soldiers serving in the rear are
receiving salaries “several times less” than those received by soldiers in the same role on the front line. Turchak also
proposed to implement other social benefits including: setting an admission quota at Russian universities for veterans, for
