1 Institute for the Study of War & The Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2023
Kateryna Stepanenko, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angela Howard, and
Frederick W. Kagan
April 22, 9pm ET
Click here to see ISWs interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISWs archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion
of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces
daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive
monthly.
Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to
confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson
Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions. Geolocated footage
published by a Russian milblogger on April 22 shows that Ukrainian forces have established positions
on the Dnipro River bank north of Oleshky (7km southwest of Kherson City) and advanced up to the
northern outskirts of the settlement on the E97 highway, as well as west of Dachi (10km south of
Kherson City).
1
This footage also indicates that Russian forces may not control islands in the Kinka and
Chaika rivers less than half a kilometer north of the geolocated Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky
Bridge. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 and 22 that Ukrainian forces have maintained
positions in east bank Kherson Oblast for weeks, established stable supply lines to these positions, and
regularly conduct sorties in the areaall indicating a lack of Russian control over the area.
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Another
milbloggers battle map claimed that Russian forces do not control some Dnipro River delta islands
southwest of Kherson City as of April 22, suggesting possible Ukrainian advances on these islands.
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Some milbloggers complained that the slow rate of Russian artillery fire due to the over-centralization
of the Russian military command allowed Ukrainian forces to land on the east bank.
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Russian forces
may be prioritizing maintaining defenses in urban areas such as Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka, leaving
the islands in the Dnipro River delta unmanned. The extent and intent of these Ukrainian positions
remain unclear, as does Ukraines ability and willingness to maintain sustained positions in this area.
ISW is recoding territory on the east bank of the Dnipro River to Ukrainian-held only now because this
is the first time ISW has observed reliable geolocated imagery of Ukrainian positions on the east bank
along with multi-sourced Russian reports of an enduring Ukrainian presence there.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian
President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian
counteroffensive. Prigozhin argued on April 21 that Russia needs to anchor itself in such a way that
it is only possible to tear out [Russian forces from their positions] with the claws of the opponent.
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Prigozhins comment followed a discussion of the Ramstein meeting results, Western commitments to
train more Ukrainian personnel and continuous military support for Ukraine. Prigozhin also noted that
Ukraine will try to tear Russian forces apart and that Russia needs to resist such attacks. Prigozhin
has been increasingly alarmist in his recent rhetoric and has made similar statements about the
uncertain future of Russian offensive operations in Donbas.
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Prigozhins calls for strengthening Russian
defenses in occupied territories and frequent discussions of the prospects of Ukrainian
counteroffensives are notable as they indicate that he is trying to amplify the discussion in the Russian
