俄罗斯进攻性战役评估,2023年4月17日

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时间:2023-06-20

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1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2023
Karolina Hird, Kateryna Stepanenko, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Layne Philipson, and
Frederick W. Kagan
April 17, 6pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated
daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by
showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian
President Vladimir Putin, likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to
accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive in Donbas. Wagner forces
appear to be receiving reinforcements, ammunition, and political recognition which is a stark deviation from
the Kremlin’s previous efforts to expend Wagner forces and Prigozhin in Bakhmut since at least January 2023.
1
Wagner-affiliated sources announced on April 17 that Wagner is training up to three motorized rifle brigades of
mobilized personnel to reinforce Wagner‘s flanks in Bakhmut.
2
Prigozhin also confirmed that Russian airborne
forces (VDV) are operating alongside Wagner and indicated that Wagner is actively receiving artillery shells.
3
Prigozhin advocated for Wagner to receive more artillery shells, which indicates that Prigozhin has reestablished
his supply of ammunition from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian State Duma will also
consider amendments to the Russian law on veterans’ rights to grant veteran status to private military companies
(PMCs) and volunteers.
4
Prigozhin had been routinely advocating for Wagner personnel to be recognized as
participants of the ”special military operation” in Ukraine, and the adoption of this bill would signify that
Prigozhin’s position in the Kremlin inner circle has improved.
The extent of Putin’s trust and favor for Prigozhin is unclear at this time, but it is likely that Putin
halted the Russian MoD’s efforts to avenge Wagner by denying Wagner reinforcements and
ammunition.
5
The New York Times, citing leaked Pentagon documents, reported that Putin personally
attempted to resolve the feud between Wagner and the Russian MoD by holding a meeting between Shoigu and
Prigozhin on February 22.
6
Putin can be turning back to Prigozhin after experiencing another disappointment
with Russian conventional forces, which did not capture Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts frontlines before the April
1 that Putin had reportedly set for them.
7
Putin is reportedly once again reappointing select Wagner-affiliated
commanders such as VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, which if true, suggests that he is
prioritizing a decisive victory at least in Bakhmut in the near term.
8
Putin likely needs an immediate victory in
Bakhmut ahead of Victory Day on May 9 or the rumored Direct Line press conference he is preparing to hold
in June to assert his authority among domestic audiences.
9
Putin’s improving relations with Wagner may also be a symptom of his hesitance to increase
mobilization and signal a return to crypto mobilization. Putin increased the annual conscription quota
from 134,000 conscripts to 147,000 men for the spring 2023 cycle, and likely is experiencing shortages of trainers
to prepare conscripts, remaining mobilized personnel, and volunteers.
10
The Kremlin may be hoping to use
Wagner trainers to prepare its mobilized forces. ISW had previously reported that the Kremlin outsourced
recruitment of personnel to nationalist groups and is currently carrying out large-scale volunteer recruitment
campaigns.
11
Wagner is currently recruiting across Russia, and it is possible that the Kremlin may still see Wagner
as a feasible source of combat power.
An interview with two former Wagner Group fighters on their treatment of Ukrainian children
and other civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) further highlights how Wagner has
institutionalized systematic brutality as part of its fundamental modus operandi. Russian human
rights organization Gulagu.net released a video interview on April 17 with two former convicts who finished their
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