1 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment April 16, 2023
Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Layne Philipson, Nicole Wolkov, George
Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan
April 16, 2:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is
updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that
ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse
map archive monthly.
The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for
offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United
Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that VDV
commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has returned to a “major” but unspecified role in
Ukraine after reports that the Russian MoD replaced him on January 13.[1] UK MoD noted that
Teplinsky’s return to command in Ukraine will not be limited to just VDV units, but that it is also
likely that Teplinsky will try to promote the VDV’s traditional role as an elite force.[2] ISW previously
assessed on April 1 that milblogger speculation that the Russian MoD recalled Teplinsky from ”leave“
suggests that Russia may be preparing to reshuffle senior commanders following the failed winter
offensive and in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[3] The UK MoD’s apparent
confirmation of Teplinsky’s reappointment to a senior command position supports ISW’s assessment,
and additionally suggests that the Russian military command is likely seeking to place an increased
emphasis on the role of VDV elements in Russian offensive operations. VDV units are actively
engaged along critical sectors of the front in Luhansk Oblast and near Bakhmut and have recently
received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, further indicating that the Russian military command
may seek to elevate the VDV to greater operational prominence.[4]
News of Teplinsky’s reappointment suggests that the Russian MoD is seeking to work
more closely with the Wagner Group in order to complete the capture of Bakhmut,
despite obvious tensions between Prigozhin and the traditional MoD
establishment. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin seemingly confirmed Teplinsky’s
Wagner affiliations in a public show of support for Teplinsky following Teplinsky’s reported dismissal
over a disagreement with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army
General Valery Gerasimov in January.[5] Teplinsky became embroiled in the rising tensions between
Prigozhin and the Russian MoD establishment (represented by Gerasimov and Russian Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu) as the Russian MoD appeared to be actively trying to cut the Wagner Group
off from artillery shell supply and otherwise interfere with Wagner’s ability to operate around
Bakhmut.[6] Over the past few weeks, however, it appears that the Russian military command has
been working more closely with Wagner, likely in an effort to expedite the capture of Bakhmut. The
Russian MoD and Prigozhin publicly acknowledged on April 11 that VDV elements are engaged in the
Bakhmut area and holding Wagner’s flanks north and south of Bakhmut while Wagner pursues the
main offensive effort in the city itself.[7] ISW has recently observed that elements of the 106th VDV
division are operating in the Bakhmut area.[8] Prigozhin has also scaled down his explicit rhetorical
attacks on the MoD in recent days. Russian milbloggers have reported that Wagner forces are
operating T-90 tanks within Bakhmut, suggesting that Russian leadership has allocated more modern
