ABOUT THE REPORT
Very little of the recent voluminous literature in English that
has discussed Hamas has focused on how to understand—and
perhaps influence—its behavior from an Islamic point of
view. We have analyzed Hamas’s statements and actions since
its inception and have concluded that Hamas has indeed
undergone significant political changes as well as certain slow,
limited, and carefully calculated ideological shifts. It is now at
the point where it is ready to explore arrangements that will
allow it and Israel to coexist without episodic violence. Its
readiness is based on the framework of Islamic law (shari‘a) in
which Hamas is embedded. Shari‘a both provides the basis for
the political actions that Hamas can take and defines which
actions are forbidden to it.
Paul Scham is a visiting professor of Jewish Studies at the
University of Maryland at College Park and executive director
of the University’s Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies.
Osama Abu-Irshaid is completing a Ph.D. thesis on Hamas at
Loughborough University, U.K., and is the founder and
editor in chief of Al-Meezan newspaper, published in
Arabic in the United States.
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SPECIAL REPORT 224 JUNE 2009
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CONTENTS
Introduction 3
Intellectual Background and Ideology 4
Concept of Jews and Israel 5
Peace Initiatives and Truces 7
Islamic Jurisprudence 9
After the Elections 12
Western Perceptions 14
Conclusions: The View from 2009 and beyond 18
Postscript 19
Paul Scham and Osama Abu-Irshaid
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Discussion in the United States regarding Hamas is usually framed by two somewhat
contradictory assumptions: (1) that Hamas is ideologically incapable of evolving to
accept the existence of Israel and (2) that isolation and strong pressure are the only
tools that may force it to recognize Israel. This controversial report challenges both
assumptions. On the one hand, the authors make a case for recognizing that Hamas
has already, in certain respects, changed and has sent signals regarding its possible
coexistence with Israel. On the other hand, they conclude that Hamas might never
“recognize” Israel in the conventional sense and that, since Hamas apparently cannot
be eliminated, attempts to engage it must take into account its commitment to the
strictures of shari‘a.
In other words, the report attempts to inject some gray areas into an issue that
is often framed only in black and white terms. In a unique approach, the authors do
not ask us to necessarily change our conclusions about the value of such engage-
ment. Instead, they invite us to reevaluate our assumptions by providing a new prism
through which to analyze Hamas. The authors themselves—one Jewish and the other
Muslim—have very different lenses on this conflict. They disagree on the definition
of the conflict and have differing views of how it can be resolved, but they share the
goal of providing a framework for understanding Hamas, its motivations, and its self-
concept, and of presenting alternative criteria for interpreting the signals that it sends.
The authors neither endorse Hamas’s actions or positions nor advocate taking Hamas’s
claims at face value, and they certainly do not argue that Israel, the United States,
and the West should drop demands for changes by Hamas. On the contrary, they offer a
framework to help policymakers develop and deliver such demands more effectively, a
framework that takes into account how Hamas views itself and how many in the Muslim
world understand the movement. With U.S. allies such as Egypt and Jordan pressing for
a Palestinian unity government inclusive of Hamas, it is imperative to consider what
kinds of conditions and safeguards would contribute to a successful peace process
rather than derail it.
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